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A “JUDICIAL” SYSTEM IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: ORTIZ V. UNITED STATES AND THE DUE-
PROCESS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS AND CONVENING AUTHORITIES  
JACOB E. MEUSCH* 
 
Abstract:  In Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018) the majority described the military 
court-martial system—a commander-controlled process for adjudicating criminal complaints—
as judicial in character.  It reached this conclusion over Justice Alito’s dissent, which took a 
diametrically opposed view, describing the system as an Executive Branch entity that could not 
exercise judicial power.  These opposing views are not new.  They have been at the center of a 
debate about the fundamental nature of courts-martial for more than a century, and Congress, 
unlike the Supreme Court, legislates consistent with Justice Alito’s executive view.  As a result of 
the Ortiz decision, however, the seam between Congress’s executive view and the Ortiz 
majority’s judicial view is now apparent, and it gives rise to a question about the 
constitutionality of the court-martial framework under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ): does the current commander-controlled process comply with the requirements of due 
process?  The answer to this question is especially relevant in today’s political environment 
where members of Congress, operating under an executive view of courts-martial, pressure 
senior military leaders to produce convictions in sexual assault cases.  Therefore, this Article 
examines the due-process question, concluding there is an argument that the UCMJ’s court-
marital framework may not meet constitutional muster.  In reaching this conclusion it highlights 
the type of structural reform that is necessary to ensure due-process compliance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 On March 6, 2019, the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Air Force, and Navy and 
the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (TJAGs) testified in front of 
the Senate Armed Services (SASC) Subcommittee on Personnel concerning the issue of the 
“Military Services’ prevention of and response to sexual assault.”1  This was not the first time 
the TJAGs testified before members of the SASC on the issue.  They did so on multiple 
occasions in 2013.2  The March 6th hearing, however, is noteworthy in two respects.  It marks 
the beginning of another round of congressional debate on how the military handles sexual 
assault cases, which is an issue that “seemed settled several years ago,” and it revives a century-
old debate about a military commander’s role as a convening authority in the court-martial 
process.3  
                                                        
1 C-SPAN, Sexual Assault in the Military (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.armed-services.senate. 
gov/hearings/19-03-06-military-services-prevention-of-and-response-to-sexual-assault 
(hereinafter “SASC Subcomm. on Personnel Hearing”). 
2 Testimony on Sexual Assaults in the Military Before the Subcomm. on Personnel of the S. 
Comm. on Armed Services, 113th Cong. 303 (2013); Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual 
Assaults in the Military Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 113th Cong 320 (2013).  The 
Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard also testified in the previous hearings. 
3 Jennifer Steinhauer & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Senator Martha McSally’s Revelation of Assault 
May Reopen Debate, N.Y. TIMES (March 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/us/ 
politics/mcsally-assault-military.html (noting that “debate over how to best get justice for 
victims” in the military was “likely to [be] renew[ed]”); Tom Vanden Brook, Sen. Martha 
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 On the issue of convening authorities, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand continues to champion a 
proposal to remove a convening authority’s ability to “refer” 4 sexual assault charges to a court-
martial, and senior leaders in the Department of Defense, now with Sen. Martha McSally’s 
support, continue to resist Sen. Gillibrand’s efforts, desiring instead to maintain the current 
commander-controlled referral process.5  As it stands, the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) vests some commanders with the authority to serve as court-martial convening 
authorities, and as a result, they have significant involvement in the court-martial process from 
beginning to end.  They call a court-martial into existence, refer charges, authorize searches, 
enter into plea agreements, hand-select members, approve or disapprove the production of 
witnesses, and, in some limited circumstances, approve, disapprove, or modify a court-martial’s 
findings and sentence should a panel of members or a judge find a servicemember guilty.6   
                                                        
McSally, Pushes to Criminalize Sexual Harassment in Military, Add Lawyers for Victims, USA 
TODAY (May 11, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/05/11/mcsally-
criminalize-sexual-harassment-add-lawyers-victims/1153267001/(“McSally . . . said she stands 
by commanders’ traditional role as the arbiter of prosecutions for sexual assault[; a] . . . stance 
[that] puts her at odds with . . . Gillibrand.”); see infra Sections II-III.   
4 The military does not use indictments to bring criminal charges against an accused 
servicemember, instead it uses “a two-part charging procedure[.]”  REPORT OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
REVIEW GROUP PART I: UCMJ RECOMMENDATIONS 291 (2015) [hereinafter MJRG Report].  The 
first part is described as the “preferral” of charges, which is the stage where a person drafts the 
charges and “officially” brings them “against the accused as a criminal matter.”  Id. at 292.  The 
second part is the “referral” of charges to a court-martial, which involves “the order of a 
convening authority that charges against an accused will be tried by a specified court-martial.” 
Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 601, Manual for Courts-Martial (2019).   
5 EUGENE R. FIDELL, MILITARY JUSTICE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 12 (2016); Vanden 
Brook, supra note 3 (“[Sen. McSally’s] defense of a commanders’ prerogative to prosecute 
sexual assault cases puts her at odds with Gillibrand and on the same page as Pentagon 
leadership.”). 
6 10 U.S.C. §§ 817, 822, 823 (2012); R.C.M. 201(b)(1) (“[F]or a court-martial to have 
jurisdiction . . . [it] must be convened by an official empowered to convene it.”); see infra 
Section IV.B.  While military judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys carry out the pre-trial 
and trial stages of a court-martial, convening authorities nevertheless maintain significant 
control.  See, e.g., The Judge Advocate’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Commander’s 
Legal Handbook 7-15 (2015), available at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/Sites/jagc.nsf/0/EE26C 
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 Since 2013, Sen. Gillibrand has made repeated efforts to “end commanders’ traditional 
disposition authority [in sexual assault cases], so that charging decisions would be made by a 
lawyer outside the chain of command.”7  To that end, she introduced the Military Justice 
Improvement Act and “garnered 55 votes in the Senate—a majority, but still five votes short of 
the 60 needed to bring debate to a close (“cloture”).”8  She tried again in 2015 to pass the bill, 
but “with changes in the composition of the Senate, support for the measure fell to 50 votes.”9  
And in March 2019, she once again signaled her intent to press for passage.10  In remarks 
directed at the TJAGs, Sen. Gillibrand explained that she wants military lawyers—not convening 
authorities—to make charging decisions in military prosecutions and acknowledged the past 
overreaction of convening authorities in response to political pressure: 
Why not, as the Navy has done, allow for a professionalization of their JAG system 
to become career criminal justice lawyers.  This . . . is exactly what all of the 
services should do. And then let the prosecutor make the ultimate decision about 
whether there is enough evidence to go forward, to convene a court-martial.  There 
is no reason that commanders shouldn’t opine on it, shouldn’t be part of the process, 
shouldn’t influence the process, but just let it be a technical decision.  Because as 
our defendant’s rights advocates have send, why do we want to push the scales 
either way?   
 
I think a lot of commanders did overreact and say “Oh, I am going to send every 
case to court-martial.” Well, maybe they did, but if you are sending false cases 
forward you are not going to instill confidence in the system.  If all of your cases 
that you move forward end up in not convicting and saying that it didn’t happen, 
do you think a survivor is going to think that system works? No. So you only want 
to send forward cases that actually have the legitimate basis and have the evidence 
that a prosecutor would look at and say, “I can win this case.” So, I would love to 
work with all of you on trying to address with how we deal with sexual assault 
better. I do not think you need to retain this right. I think it is a red herring to say 
                                                        
E7A9678A67A85257E1300563559/$File/Commanders%20Legal%20HB%202015%20C1.pdf 
(“The disciplinary system in the military is a Commander owned and operated system.”).  
7 FIDELL, supra note 5.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 SASC Subcomm. on Personnel Hearing, supra note 1. 
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we are making you less in charge. We’re not. We’re just taking one technical 
decision away [from convening authorities].11  
 
 Despite Sen. Gillibrand’s efforts, senior military leaders have “stoutly” opposed her 
proposal.12  Notably, Eugene Fidell, a Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, 
believes that such opposition will eventually give way and that Sen. Gillibrand will succeed in 
passing her bill “(or something like it),” even if it “take[s] several more years.”13  At present, 
however, it is unclear whether his prediction is accurate, especially given Sen. McSally’s 
opposition.14  A retired colonel in the Air Force, survivor of military sexual assault, and member 
of the SASC, Sen. McSally announced in the March 6th hearing that she is opposed to legislation 
that would remove referral authority from convening authorities:  
[W]e must allow, we must demand that commanders stay at the center of the 
solution and live up to the moral and legal responsibilities that come with being a 
commander.  We must fix those distortions in the culture of our military permit 
sexual harm towards women, and yes, some men as well.  We must educate, select, 
and then further educate commanders who want to do the right thing, but are naive 
to the realities of sexual assault. We must ensure that all commanders are trained 
and empowered to take legal action, prosecute fairly, and rid perpetrators from our 
ranks. And if the commander is the problem, or fails in his or her duties, they must 
be removed and held harshly accountable.  
 
I don’t take this position lightly. It’s been framed often that some people are 
advocating for the victims while others are advocating for the command chain or 
the military establishment. This is clearly a false choice. . . . I very strongly believe 
that the commander must not be removed from the decision-making responsibility 
of preventing, detecting, and prosecuting military sexual assault.15     
 
 With Sen. McSally’s opposition to Sen. Gillibrand, the issue of a convening authority’s 
role in the court-martial process is once again at the center of a congressional debate.  Since 
                                                        
11 Id. at 1:52:00.  
12 FIDELL, supra note 5. 
13 Id.  
14 Steinhauer & Oppel Jr., supra note 3; Vanden Brook, supra note 3. 
15 SASC Subcomm. on Personnel Hearing, supra note 1 at 12:50; Vanden Brook, supra note 3. 
 5 
Congress enacted the UCMJ following World War II (WWII), a commander’s role as a 
convening authority has always been a central (and contentious) military justice issue.  In the 
years following enactment of the UCMJ, however, a lot changed.  Congress enacted statutory 
reforms that enhanced the judicial character of the court-martial process.  And in 2018, the 
Supreme Court noted as much.  In Ortiz v. United States, Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, 
used a single word to describe the “character” of the military’s court-martial system: “judicial.”16  
Accordingly, there is another layer of analysis to consider when it comes to a convening 
authority’s role in the court-martial process: whether and to what degree must the UCMJ allow 
convening authorities to operate with judicial independence in order for a court-martial to retain 
its judicial character.  This Article addresses that issue, and in so doing, it seeks to inform the 
current debate on a convening authority’s role in the court-martial process, suggesting that 
members of Congress should view convening authorities as judicial actors.17   
 The modern debate usually compares a convening authority to a prosecutor as a means of 
framing the issue.  That comparison, however, is incomplete.  While convening authorities do 
serve in a “quasi-prosecutorial role and wield . . . discretionary authority over charges and 
pleas,” they also serve in “quasi-judicial roles.”18  Indeed, the UCMJ clearly recognizes this fact, 
describing some of a convening authority’s “acts” as “judicial.”19  Yet the judicial nature of a 
convening authority’s role is often underappreciated in the debate on the issue, and this lack of 
attention is problematic.  The distinction between judicial and prosecutorial roles is significant, 
                                                        
16 Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2174 (2018). 
17 This Article intentionally takes no position on any proposed changes to a convening 
authority’s role in the court-martial process.  
18 Monu Bedi, Unraveling Unlawful Command Influence, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1401, 1403-04 
(2009).  
19 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2012).   
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especially with respect to how members of Congress interact with convening authorities, TJAGs, 
and their superiors in the chain of command.  Prosecutors operate as one party to a proceeding—
the United States—while judges do not.  Instead, judges have a distinct judicial responsibility to 
both parties.  Therefore, while it may be appropriate for members of Congress to encourage a 
military prosecutor to pursue sexual assault convictions as a matter of policy, it is not appropriate 
for them to encourage a military judge to do so.  The Fifth Amendment requires judges to remain 
impartial, making independent decisions grounded in the law and facts of the cases before 
them.20   
 Those same considerations of impartiality and independence, as this Article argues, 
should also guide convening authorities in the exercise of their judicial responsibilities.21  
Correspondingly, this means that even though the role of a convening authority is neither purely 
prosecutorial nor purely judicial,22 there is a need for members of Congress to respect the 
independence that is required for convening authorities to perform their judicial duties under the 
UCMJ.  The modern debate, however, has largely overlooked this need, and consequently, many 
well-intended legislators have incentivized senior military leaders, including TJAGs, to influence 
convening authorities and courts-martial in a way that violates the prohibition on unlawful 
influence—Article 37, UCMJ.23  In turn, this has resulted in military appellate courts overturning 
                                                        
20 See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 179 (1994) (evaluating the constitutionality of the 
UCMJ’s appellate judicial structure under the Due Process Clause). 
21 Notably, the Army expressly recognizes this point: “The commander plays a quasi-judicial 
role in the system, making decisions that in the civilian sector would be made by professional 
prosecutors or judges.  Commanders must remain neutral and detached from the circumstances 
and make the best decision for the unit, the Soldier, and the interest of justice.”  The Judge 
Advocate’s Legal Center and School, supra note 6, at 11. 
22 Bedi, supra note 18. 
23 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2012).  As the Military Justice Review Group (MJRG) recently explained, 
“[u]nder Article 37, interference” by anyone “subject to the Code is prohibited.”  MJRG Report, 
supra note 4, at 19.  This “prohibition has no direct parallel in federal civilian practice, but is 
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convictions for sex offenses, finding politically motivated “unlawful influence” tainted them.24  
Such cases demonstrate a court-martial’s susceptibility to pressure from members of Congress, 
and they stand in stark contrast to the Ortiz majority’s description of the court-martial process as 
judicial in character.   
 Given the resurgence of the debate—this time between the competing positions of Sen. 
Gillibrand and Sen. McSally—the controversy surrounding the role of a convening authority 
seems poised to endure into the future and will likely continue to give rise to extensive 
interaction between senior military leaders and members of Congress.  Unfortunately, as the past 
several years have demonstrated, when members of Congress use their interaction with senior 
military leaders to pressure them towards specific outcomes in a category of cases, that pressure 
metastasizes throughout the military justice system as “unlawful influence.”25  And if left 
unchecked, such pressure threatens to undermine both the integrity of the military justice system 
and its judicial character.   
 To be sure, it is possible for Congress to legislate in a manner that does not incentive 
senior military leaders to resort to unlawful influence.  Doing so, however, requires members of 
Congress to view convening authorities as judicial actors and not just prosecutors.  While some 
                                                        
essential in ensuring a system that maintains the confidence of both servicemembers and the 
public.”  Id. “The prohibition against unlawful command influence was a driving factor behind 
the enactment of the UCMJ[,]” and it is one of the reasons the Court found the UCMJ and 
corresponding regulations “‘sufficiently preserved judicial impartiality so as to satisfy the Due 
Process Clause’ requirement for ‘a fair trial in a fair tribunal.’”  Id. (quoting Weiss v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 163, 179 (1994)).   
24 United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2018); United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242 
(C.A.A.F. 2017); United States v. Riesbeck, 77 M.J. 154, 159 (C.A.A.F. 2017); United States v. 
Schloff, No. 20150724, 2018 CCA LEXIS 350, *3 (A.C.C.A. Feb. 5, 2018); United States v. 
Wright, 75 M.J. 501, 503 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015); United States v. Howell, No. 201200264, 
2014 CCA LEXIS 321, *11-12 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. May 22, 2014). 
25 See supra note 24.   
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members of Congress may initially balk at such a shift, there are good reasons for doing so, and 
this Article sets forth those reasons, proceeding in five parts.  First, it outlines two competing 
views on the fundamental nature of courts-martial—executive and judicial—and describes how 
they frame the debate on a convening authority’s role in the court-martial process.  Second, 
drawing on the Ortiz majority’s rationale, it looks to the historical development of a convening 
authority’s role in the court-martial as evidence of its judicial nature.  Third, given a convening 
authority’s judicial role, it examines the modern reform movement and how it gave rise to issues 
of politically motivated unlawful influence.  Fourth, it discusses how the Court’s decision in 
Ortiz may give rise to a due-process challenge if members of Congress do not adopt a judicial 
view of courts-martial and take action accordingly.  Finally, it outlines of a possible due-process 
challenge should Congress fail to take such action.  
II. JUDICIAL OR EXECUTIVE: COMPETING VIEWS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF 
COURTS-MARTIAL 
 
 To understand the impact of Ortiz on the relationship between Congress and convening 
authorities, it is first necessary to outline the two competing views of courts-martial—the judicial 
view and the executive view—discussed in the decision.  In Ortiz, the Court examined whether it 
had “jurisdiction to review” the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
(CAAF).26  Justice Kagan reasoned in her majority opinion that the “judicial character and 
constitutional pedigree of the court-martial system enable[d]” the Court to exercise “appellate 
jurisdiction” over the CAAF’s decisions.27  The majority reached this conclusion even though 
“Congress established the CAAF under its Article I, rather than its Article III, powers and . . . 
                                                        
26 Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2170. 
27 Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2173.  “Atop the court-martial system is the CAAF, a ‘court of record’ 
made up of five civilian judges appointed to serve 15-year terms.” Id. at 2171. 
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located the CAAF . . . within the Executive Branch, rather than the judicial one.”28  For Justice 
Kagan and the majority, the location of the CAAF in the Executive Branch—one of the two 
“political branches”29 of government—did not matter as much as the “character” of the court-
martial system itself.30  In reviewing the “character” of the court-martial system, the majority 
concluded that it “closely resemble[d] civilian structures of justice” and “operated as [an] 
instrument[] of military justice.”31  Accordingly, the majority found the Court had jurisdiction to 
review decisions from the CAAF.32   
 Not all of the Justices, however, agreed with the majority’s description of the court-
martial system’s character or that such character was more important, for jurisdictional purposes, 
than the system’s location within the three branches of government.  In dissent, Justice Alito, 
joined by Justice Gorsuch, focused intently on the CAAF’s location in the Executive Branch—
the constitutional source of the CAAF’s “power”—as opposed to the “character” of its process.33  
As Justice Alito explained, “Executive Branch officers,” like the judges appointed to the CAAF, 
“cannot lawfully exercise the judicial power of any sovereign, no matter how court-like their 
decision making process might appear,” and “[t]hat means their decisions cannot be appealed 
directly” to the Supreme Court.34  In Justice Alito’s view, “Article III of the Constitution” gave 
“every single drop” of “judicial power” to the Supreme Court and the “inferior Courts” 
                                                        
28 Id. at 2176.  
29 John F. O’Connor, Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. 
REV. 161, 166 (2000). 
30 Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2176. 
31 Id. at 2170, 2175. 
32 Id. at 2170-71 (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1259, we have jurisdiction to review the CAAF’s decisions 
by writ of certiorari.”).  
33 Id. at 2189-90, 2203-05 (Alito, J. dissenting) (describing the majority’s analysis as the “looks 
like” test that is “utterly inadequate to police separation-of-powers disputes”). 
34 Id. at 2190. 
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established by Congress, which meant that neither the CAAF nor the court-martial system were 
exercising judicial power.35  
 As a result, Justices Alito and Gorsuch found that the CAAF—an Article I court located 
in the Executive Branch—exercised executive instead of judicial power and concluded this 
distinction had constitutional significance.  Because “Article II authorizes the President to 
discipline the military without invoking the judicial power of the United States” the Court always 
found it permissible for the President to maintain a system of military courts-martial—ad-hoc 
tribunals that lacked the constitutional safeguards of an Article III court and were historically 
seen as “blunt instruments to enforce discipline.”36  Courts-martial “represented the exercise of 
the power given to the President in the head of the Executive Branch and the Commander in 
Chief and delegated by him to military commanders.”37  Therefore, in Justice Alito’s view, even 
though the court-martial system lacked the constitutional safeguards of an Article III court, such 
a structure was constitutionally permissible because of its location outside of the Judicial Branch.  
“[A]djudications by courts-martial are executive decisions; courts-martial are not courts; they do 
not wield judicial power, and their proceedings are not criminal prosecutions within the meaning 
of the Constitution.”38 
 Notably, the crux of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent involves a 
question concerning the fundamental nature of courts-martial.  All of the Justices recognize that 
courts-martial are “older than the Constitution,”39 but they diverge on the significance associated 
with the court-martial system’s location within the three branches of government.  All of the 
                                                        
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 2201. 
37 Id. at 2199. 
38 Id. at 2200. 
39 Id. at 2168, 2190. 
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Justices agree that the CAAF is an Executive Branch entity and that modern-day courts-martial 
have judicial-like procedures, yet they reach diametrically opposed conclusions about the 
fundamental nature of a court-martial and the power it wields.  For Justice Kagan and the 
majority, courts-martial are judicial in nature, wielding at least some judicial power, and for 
Justices Alito and Gorsuch, they are executive in nature, wielding only executive power.   
 When considering the tension between these two views, it is important to highlight that 
they are not new.  Rather, Ortiz marks the latest chapter in a debate that is more than a century 
old.  In 1919, the acting Judge Advocate General of the Army, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) 
Samuel Ansell, described these competing views in testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Military Affairs, explaining there were “two diametrically opposed legal theories as to courts-
martial.”40  One theory was that “a court-martial is an executive agency, belonging to and under 
control of the military commander[,]” and the other was that “a court-martial is inherently 
judicial . . . and limited by the established principles of jurisprudence which govern the exercise 
of judicial functions in our system.”41   
 And it’s not just justices on the Supreme Court who hold these opposing views.  Unlike 
the Ortiz majority, Congress takes an executive view of courts-martial, treating the court-martial 
system as an Executive Branch entity when crafting legislation.  And once again, the competing 
views between Congress and a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court are not new.  It is 
something that has persisted for more than a century.  As Brig. Gen. Ansell observed in 1919, the 
“Supreme Court has always recognized the inherent judicial quality of courts-martial; Congress, 
                                                        
40 A Bill to Promote the Administration of Military Justice by Amending Existing Laws 
Regulating Trial by Courts-Martial, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the Sen. 
Subcommittee on Military Affairs, 65th Cong. 6 (1919) (statement of Brig. Gen. Samuel T. 
Ansell) (hereinafter “Ansell’s Senate Statement”). 
41 Id.   
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however, . . . has legislated rather upon the other theory”—that “a court-martial is an executive 
agency, belonging to and under the control of the military commander.”42  For the dissent in 
Ortiz, this latter point—the fact that a military commander controls the court-martial process—is 
a key distinction that undermines claims in favor of the court-martial system’s judicial 
character.43    
 Since 1919, however, Congress has enacted significant changes to the court-martial 
system, passing the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950 and several additional 
reforms in the ensuing decades.  In doing so, Congress enhanced the judicial features of the 
court-martial framework, deliberately making it more closely resemble civilian courts.44  Yet 
despite these reforms, Congress never removed the court-marital process from a convening 
authority’s control, and for the dissent in Ortiz, that was a telling fact.  As Justice Alito 
explained, “the UCMJ preserves the chain of command’s historic revisory power[.]”45  Court-
martial judgments “cannot be executed until the President, the relevant branch Secretary, or one 
of his subordinates approves it,” and this aspect of court-martial procedure is “radically 
inconsistent” with the idea of “judicial power,” which does not permit “members of the 
                                                        
42 Id.  
43 As Brig. Gen. Ansell noted, a military commander in 1919 exercised “a large and almost 
unrestrained discretion” in the court-martial process, “determining (1) who shall be tried, (2) the 
sufficiency of the charge, (3) the prima facie sufficiency of the proof, (4) the composition of the 
court-martial, (5) passing upon all questions of law arising during the progress of the trial, and 
(6) reviewing the record for what he may conceive to be its sufficiency in law and fact.”  Id. And 
under a theory of executive agency, he explained, “[a]ll of these questions are controlled[,] . . . 
not by law, but by the power of military command.” Id. 
44 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2012) (authorizing the President to enact “regulations which shall, 
so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally 
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts”).  
45 Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2205 (Alito, J. dissenting).  
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Executive or Legislative Branches” to have the power to revise or suspend “any court’s 
judgments.”46  
 Of course, Justice Alito’s executive view did not prevail.  The majority rejected the 
argument that the “constitutional foundations, history, and fundamental character” of courts-
martial “show that they are Executive Branch entities that can only permissibly exercise 
executive power.”47  And the majority’s rejection is important.  It frames the tension between the 
judicial and executive views of courts-martial and underlines that a majority of the justices 
subscribe to the judicial view at a time when members of Congress subscribe to the executive 
view.  Going forward, unless Congress adopts the Ortiz majority’s judicial view, these two 
competing views will remain in tension and will continue to frame the issue of a convening 
authority’s role in the court-martial process, especially given that congressional debate is heating 
up again.  And as the following sections explain, it would be in the best interest of the military 
justice system, and the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces, for members of 
Congress to adopt the judicial view of courts-martial.   
III. LOOKING BACK: CONVENING AUTHORITIES AS JUDICIAL ACTORS WITHIN THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH BEFORE THE MODERN-DAY REFORM MOVEMENT 
 
 Having outlined the judicial and executive views, the remainder of this Article explains 
why it makes sense for Congress to adopt the Ortiz majority’s judicial view, starting with an 
examination of the historical development of a convening authority’s role in the court-martial 
process.  Before Ortiz, opponents of the judicial view likely looked to history as a way to justify 
the executive view.48  They could look to the location of the court-martial system within the 
                                                        
46 Id. at 2204-05 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 871(a), (b) (2012)). 
47 Id. at 2206.  
48 Compare Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2174 (describing the military justice system as “judicial” in 
“character”) with Donald w. Hansen, Judicial Functions for the Commander?, 41 MIL. L. REV. 1, 
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branches of government and make a straightforward argument that convening authorities were 
executive actors, as opposed to judicial actors.  Convening authorities are military commanders 
(or their superiors, which includes the service Secretaries and the President).  They generally 
lack formal legal training.  They are not military judges, and they do not derive any authority 
from Article III of the Constitution.49  To the contrary, they are members of the Executive 
Branch, and the Court has “frequently note[d]” as much.50  “[T]he Constitution vests control over 
the military in the political branches, and not in the courts,”51  which suggests that convening 
authorities are not judicial actors under Article III since they fall under the Executive Branch.  
Before Ortiz, opponents of the judicial view could have even gone so far as to argue that this had 
been the case throughout American history.  The Constitution gave Congress the power to decide 
where to locate the court-martial system within the branches of government, and Congress 
always gave courts-martial to the Executive Branch, as opposed to the Judicial Branch.52   
 After Ortiz, however, that argument is much more difficult to make.  The Ortiz majority 
rejected the dissent’s argument that the location of the court-martial system within the branches 
of government determined the type of power that its actors were exercising.  As a result, post-
Ortiz, there is room to argue that convening authorities are judicial actors based on the 
characteristics of the court-marital process.  Indeed, following Ortiz, the more tenuous argument 
                                                        
50 (1968) (concluding that while convening authorities have a “judicial function” the “court-
marital is an instrument of the executive branch for the enforcement of discipline.”).  
49 Hansen, supra note 48, at 23 (“If the court-martial is not an article III court[,] . . . . [then] the 
commander is exercising executive powers, albeit pursuant to a legislative grant[.]”).  
50 O’Connor, supra note 29, at 166. 
51 Id. 
52 See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19 (1827) (observing that Congress gave the President authority 
over courts-martial in “the act of the 28th of February, 1795”); Hansen, supra note 47 (“The 
historical development of the commander’s relationship to military justice displays a recognition 
that the court-martial is an instrument of the executive branch for the enforcement of 
discipline.”).  
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seems to be that convening authorities are executive actors, as opposed to judicial actors, because 
they are members of the Executive Branch.  
 In this way, Ortiz shows how convening authorities in the court-martial process should be 
viewed, which has important implications for members of Congress and opponents of the judicial 
view.  It is not sufficient to only consider the court-martial system’s location within the branches 
of government.  Post-Ortiz it is necessary to look beneath the surface and examine the role of a 
convening authority from a process-characteristics perspective.  And from this perspective, there 
is ample historical support for the conclusion that convening authorities are judicial actors.  
A. THE ROLE OF CONVENING AUTHORITIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 The Constitution vested Congress with the power to shape both the court-martial system 
and a military commander’s role in it.  Before the Constitutional Convention, “the Second 
Continental Congress codified the first American Articles of War, which, among other things, 
provided for courts-martial for certain prescribed offenses.”53  Therefore, by the time of the 
Constitutional Convention “there was little question” among the delegates that “there would be 
federal military justice separate and apart from Article III” courts.54  What was uncertain, 
however, was what the military justice system would look like.55  The shape of the military 
justice system fell to Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution, which 
states that Congress shall have the power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
                                                        
53 Stephen I. Vladek, Military Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 939 (2015) (citing 3 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 378). 
54 Id. (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 330 (2005)). 
55 Id.  
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of the land and naval Forces[.]”56  And in the years that followed, Congress created a court-
martial process that “developed as a separate legal system under command control[.]”57   
 Courts-martial, of course, existed only as ad-hoc forums, which made a military 
commander’s control an operational necessity.  Military commanders “called [them] into 
existence for a special purpose and to perform a particular duty.”58  That duty was to adjudicate a 
criminal charge against a servicemember, return a verdict (and sentence if the court-martial 
found the accused guilty), and then report back to the military commander who convened the 
court-martial (or the Secretary of War or the President as required under the relevant provision of 
the Articles of War).59  Once the court-martial accomplished this task, it was “dissolved,” and the 
execution of its findings and sentence were subject to the approval (or “revisory power”60) of the 
military commander who convened the court-martial.61  In terms of process characteristics, this 
aspect of a military commander’s involvement appeared judicial in nature.  A commander “was 
not at liberty to delegate this duty to another,” and was required to “act according to . . . [his] 
own judgment.”62   
 Moreover, as early as 1887 the Supreme Court endorsed the view that a convening 
authority’s role in the court-martial process was judicial.  In Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 
                                                        
56 U.S. Const. art. 1 § 8, cl. 14.  See also Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 79 (1857) (“Congress has 
the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences . . . and . . . the 
power to do so is . . . without any connection” to Article III of the Constitution).   
57 Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1400 
(1973). 
58 Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 555 (1887). 
59 Id.  
60 Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2205 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
61 Runkle, 122 U.S. at 556. When a commander “disagreed with an acquittal,” this power 
included the authority to “ask the court members to reconsider their finding.”  MJRG Report, 
supra note 4, at 55. 
62 Id.  
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543 (1887), Chief Justice Waite observed that the power to review and act on a court-martial’s 
findings and sentence was “judicial in its character.”63  Elaborating on this description, he noted 
that a person who takes such action must “consider the proceedings laid before him and decide 
personally whether they ought to be carried into effect.”64  This meant that “[h]is personal 
judgment [was] required, as much so as it would have been in passing on the case, if he had been 
one of the members of the court-martial itself.”65  And thus “his judgment, when pronounced, 
must be his own judgment and not that of another . . . because he is the person, and the only 
person, to whom has been committed th[is] important judicial power[.]”66   
B. THE ROLE OF CONVENING AUTHORITIES IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 As the country moved into the twentieth century, and eventually into World War I, 
convening authorities continued to exercise control over the court-martial process, carrying out a 
similar role.67  However, by the time that Brig. Gen. Ansell testified before the Senate in 1919, 
                                                        
63 Runkle, 122 U.S. at 557.  In 1864, Attorney General Bates drafted a legal opinion for President 
Lincoln and expressly described this power as “judicial.”  Id. at 558.  Attorney General Bates 
explained that the “act of the officer who reviews the proceedings[,]  . . . whether he be the 
commander of the fleet or the President, and without whose approval the sentence cannot be 
executed, is as much a part of th[e] judgment . . . as the trial or the sentence.” Id.  In his opinion, 
the “duty of approving the sentence of a court-martial” was an action that had “all the solemnity 
and significance of the judgment of a court of law.” Id.  In 1887, the Supreme Court adopted the 
same view as Attorney General Bates. Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. The Military Justice Review Group aptly summarized the nature of this power:  
 
The commanding officer who convened the court-martial had a legal duty to 
personally review and act on the case, exercising personal judgment as if the 
commanding officer were one of the court-martial members.  The action was 
judicial in nature, involving the exercise of discretion to act according to the 
commanding officer’s own judgment[.]”  
 
MJRG Report, supra note 4, at 55.   
67 Historically, a commander, serving in the role of a convening authority, had the power to 
review the outcome of a court-martial and decide whether it should be approved. Id. at 335.  In 
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the competing views of the fundamental nature of courts-martial had emerged with Congress 
adopting the executive view and the Court leaning more towards the judicial view.  At the same 
time, the public started to pay attention to the nature of the court-martial process and a convening 
authority’s role in it.  Following two high-profile cases in the early twentieth century, there was 
significant public criticism denouncing courts-martial and describing the role of a convening 
authority as arbitrary.68   
 Of those two cases, the one that generated the most public backlash was the “Houston 
Riots Courts-Martial of 1917.”69  The case involved a racially charged riot that lasted two hours 
and “left fifteen white citizens dead (including four Houston police officers).”70  Sixty-three 
African-American Soldiers” were “court-martialed in the ‘largest murder trial in the history of 
the United States.’”71  “The accused—all of whom pleaded not guilty—were represented by a 
single defense counsel” who was “not a lawyer.”72  The trial spanned “twenty-two days” and 
included testimony from “196 witnesses.”73  “[D]espite the inherent conflict of interest,” the sole 
defense counsel argued that some men should be acquitted while “acknowledging” that others 
                                                        
carrying out this action, a commander could exercise unfettered discretion, which meant that 
even where court-martial members found a servicemember guilty of an offense, a military 
commander could disapprove the conviction. Id. at 61.  Similarly, a military commander could 
also intervene to change an acquittal to a finding of guilty, and, for example, in World War I 
“one-third of all acquittals . . . had been changed to guilty verdicts at the request of the 
convening authority.” Id.   
68 Fred L. Borch, Military Justice in Turmoil: The Ansell-Crowder Controversy of 1917-1920, 
2017 ARMY LAW. 1, 1 (2017); Fred L. Borch, Lore of the Corps: “The Largest Murder Trial in 
the History of the United States”: The Houston Riots Courts-Martial of 1917, 2011 ARMY LAW. 
1, 1 (2011) (quoting THE ARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S 
CORPS 125, at 130 (1975)) 
69 Borch, Lore of the Corps, supra note 68, at 1 (quoting THE ARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE 
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS 125, at fig. 37 (1975)). 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 2.  
73 Id.  
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“were culpable[.]”74  At the conclusion of the court-martial, five soldiers were acquitted, forty-
one were sentenced to life imprisonment, and thirteen were sentenced to death by hanging.75  
Two days after these thirteen soldiers learned of their death sentence, they “were handcuffed, 
transported by truck to a hastily constructed wooden scaffold, and hanged at sunrise.”76  
 While the convening authority was permitted to carry out the execution of these thirteen 
men under the Articles of War, the decision to do so nevertheless generated “outcry and 
criticism,” which prompted Brig. Gen. Ansell to create “a Board of Review with duties ‘in the 
nature of an appellate tribunal’”77—an action taken with a focus on increasing the judicial 
character of the court-martial system.  General Ansell also made numerous legislative proposals 
aimed at moving “courts-martial away from their focus on discipline at the expense of justice” 
and towards “proceedings” that were “judicial” from “beginning to end[.]”78  In part, his hope 
was for Congress to eventually establish a “military judiciary” that was “untrammeled and 
uncontrolled in the exercise of its functions by the power of military command.”79   
C. THE ROLE OF CONVENING AUTHORITIES UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF 
MILITARY JUSTICE 
 
 While Congress did not initially create the full-scale judicial framework that Brig. Gen. 
Ansell had hoped for, his “ideas about military justice were not forgotten.”80  “His firm belief 
that there must be more limits on the role of the commander in the system . . . [was] accepted by 
                                                        
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 3 (quoting THE ARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS 
125, at 130 (1975)) 
78 Borch, Military Justice in Turmoil, supra note 68, at 5 (quoting Edmund Morgan, The Existing 
Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles, 29 YALE L. J. 52, 73-74 (1919)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
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Congress when it established a three civilian judge [Court of Military Appeals] as part of the 
UCMJ in 1950, and when it later created the position of the military judge in the Military Justice 
Act of 1968.”81  In making these changes, Congress removed a significant portion of a convening 
authority’s control over the court-martial process and gave the military justice system a character 
that was decidedly more judicial.  This is true even though Congress kept convening authorities 
as a central fixture in the court-martial process and continued to house the court-martial system 
entirely within the Executive Branch.  Convening authorities maintained their revisory power 
over the court-martial and had significant control over the entire court-martial process.82  As a 
result, Congress kept convening authorities in a judicial role, but in doing so, Congress added a 
new set of judicial actors, as well as a statutory safeguard to protect all of the judicial actors in a 
court-martial from unlawful influence.83 
                                                        
81 Id. Congress has since changed the name of this court to “the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces.”  United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 
https://www.armfor. uscourts.gov/about.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2018); see also JONATHAN 
LURIE, PURSUING MILITARY JUSTICE: VOLUME 2, 27-47 (1998); JONATHAN LURIE, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND MILITARY JUSTICE, 5 (2013).  
82 “Under the UCMJ, the convening authority continued to exercise an appellate-type review 
function with responsibility to act on the findings and sentence, and was only to approve them to 
the extent that he found them correct in law and fact” and believed they “should be approved.” 
MJRG Report, supra note 4, at 80.  
83 Regarding the enhanced judicial character of the court-martial process, the context in which 
the UCMJ was created is also important.  It not only included significant procedural reforms, but 
also served as a mechanism to unify the court-martial practices among the services.   Congress 
passed the UCMJ in response to public outcry after World War II, and notably, much of the 
criticism echoed the concerns that Brig. Gen. Ansell expressed a generation earlier about 
“autocracy in the handling of . . . courts martial[.]”  John W. Brooker, Improving Uniform Code 
of Military Justice Reform, 222 MIL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2014).  In response, Congress passed the 
Elston Act in 1948, which significantly revised the Articles of War, and then it passed the 
UCMJ, which incorporated the Elston Act and created “a single military code” for “all of the 
armed forces.” Notably, Congress passed the UCMJ shortly after it “combined the military 
departments into a single organization, which became the Department of Defense.” Id. MJRG 
Report, supra note 4, at 69.  President Truman signed the UCMJ into law on May 5, 1950, and 
the UCMJ went into effect on May 31, 1951.  From that point until today, the UCMJ—and its 
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 To be fair, before choosing a statutory framework that would keep convening authorities 
at the center of the court-martial process, members of Congress devoted considerable attention to 
the possibility of removing them.  For example, Rep. Carl T. Durham and Rep. Philip J. Philbin 
highlighted the problems with such a framework.84  Rep. Durham described the convening 
authority’s power in the court-martial process as “disturbing,” noting that this power included the 
authority “to accuse, to draft and direct the charges, to select the prosecutor and defense counsel 
from the officers under his command, to choose the members of the court, to review and alter 
their decision, and to change any sentence imposed.”85  Rep. Philbin characterized the military 
justice system as “arbitrary” in character and believed that it caused a “manifest denial of 
constitutional safeguards generally recognized by civil courts since the establishment of the 
Government.”86  Nevertheless, he conceded that it “would be a grave error to attribute to our 
military leaders, as a whole, willful and deliberate disregard for fundamental principles of 
justice.”87  
 Other members of Congress focused on the new statutory prohibition on unlawful 
influence in the UCMJ as a way to square the enhanced judicial character of courts-martial with 
their decision to retain a convening authority’s control of the process.  Rep. Charles H. Elston, 
for example, agreed that further reforms were needed, but pushed back on the idea that a 
convening authority framework could not operate in a just manner.88  From Rep. Elston’s 
                                                        
prohibition on unlawful influencing judicial actors—has applied to “all of the military services—
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.” Id. at 69-70. 
84 95 CONG. R. PT. 5, 5718 (May 5, 1949), available at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ 
Military_Law/pdf/congr-floor-debate.pdf [hereinafter 1949 DEB.]. 
85 Id. at 21.  
86 Id. at 23. 
87 Id. 
88 As “chair of a Legal Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 
Representative Elston conducted a detailed investigation of the military justice system[,] . . . 
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perspective, it was sufficient to prevent such abuse through “safeguards over [command] 
authority.”89  Rep. Thomas Overton Brooks described “the question of command control” as the 
“most troublesome question,” and then highlighted that the UCMJ made “it a court-martial 
offense for any person subject to this code to unlawfully influence the action of a court-
martial.”90   
  Notably absent from this debate, however, was explicit guidance as to whether members 
of Congress viewed a convening authority’s role as judicial in character.  Consistent with Rep. 
Philbin’s suggestion that military leaders were capable of taking action in accord with 
fundamental principles of justice, Congress seemed to believe that the UCMJ’s new court-
martial system would hew closer to the judicial character of civilian courts despite a convening 
authority’s control.  But whether Congress viewed the role of a convening authority as judicial, 
instead of executive, is not apparent.   
 One possible explanation for the silence on this issue is that, as a functional matter, 
members of Congress did not give the distinction much thought since they placed the court-
martial system in the Executive Branch.  Indeed, it was this location outside the Judicial Branch 
that created the need for the UCMJ’s judicial enhancements in the first place.  Unlike Article III 
courts, the court-martial system, by design, operated without significant constitutional safeguards 
because it was seen as a necessary component of military command—an Executive Branch 
function.  And under its executive view of courts-martial, it stands to reason that Congress saw 
                                                        
recommended many reforms, and more importantly, supported each recommendation with 
detailed and persuasive evidence.” Brooker, supra note 83, at 63.  His efforts led to the Elston 
Act reforms in 1948 and also ensured “the ‘battlefield was prepared’ for the debates and 
exchanges that led to the 1950” bill enacting the UCMJ.  Id.   
89 1949 DEB., supra note 84, at 16 
90 Id. at 10. 
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the judicial character of a convening authority’s role as inconsequential insofar as the source of 
the convening authority’s power within the court-martial system was concerned.   
 Nevertheless, regardless of the intent behind Congress’s decision to enhance the judicial 
character of the court-martial system while housing it in the Executive Branch, the Court 
continued to hew towards a judicial view of courts-martial, and by judicial standards, it still 
looked down on military justice even after the UCMJ was enacted.91  Recognizing that Congress 
made “a number of improvements” to the military justice system in the UCMJ, a plurality of the 
Court diminished those improvements in 1957 because they were “merely statutory.”92  As the 
plurality opinion explained in Reid v. Covert, “Congress—and perhaps the President—can 
reinstate former practices, subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, whenever it 
desires.”93  Noting that a military trial was not a “trial by jury before an independent judge after 
an indictment by a grand jury,” the plurality opinion characterized military law as 
“emphasiz[ing] the iron hand of discipline more than . .  the even scales of justice[,]” and 
recognized that “command influence” was a continuing issue because “members of the court-
martial must look to the appointing officer for promotions, advantageous assignments and 
                                                        
91 When compared to an Article III court, a court-martial was always lacking in constitutional 
safeguards.  Therefore, under a judicial view the court-martial system has historically been seen 
as procedurally lacking yet trending towards greater judicial character.  Compare United States 
v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 918 (2009) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (“Traditionally military justice 
has been a rough form of justice emphasizing summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern 
penalties with a view to maintaining obedience and fighting fitness in the ranks.”) (quoting Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1957)) with United States v. Acevedo, 77 M.J. 185, 191 (C.A.A.F. 
2018) (Ryan, J. dissenting) (“In the current climate, where it appears that neither the convening 
authority nor the lower courts are immune from external pressures, . . . [the CAAF] has a 
heighted responsibility to ensure that servicemembers receive fair and impartial justice, instead 
of a ‘rough form of justice.’”).    
92 Reid, 354 U.S. at 37. 
93 Id.  
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efficiency ratings—in short, for their future progress in the service.”94  Then, commenting on the 
character of the court-martial system, the plurality opinion observed that the President “and his 
military subordinates exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers with respect to those 
subject to military trials[,]” and that “[s]uch blending of functions in one branch of Government 
is the objectionable thing which the draftsmen of the Constitution endeavored to prevent by 
providing for the separation of governmental powers.”95  Despite such criticism, however, it is 
notable that the plurality opinion recognized, at least from a process-characteristics perspective, 
that the President and his military subordinates exercised some quantum of power that was 
judicial in nature in connection with courts-martial. 
D. EARLY REFORMS TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
 Not too long after Reid, the United States found itself in another large-scale war—this 
time Vietnam—and military justice found its way back into a national debate.  As Judge Walter 
T. Cox III, a former judge on the United States Court of Military Appeals,96 explained: 
The Vietnam War years brought much controversy to the system. In 1969, the 
book, Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music, was published. 
This critique of the system was described by Mike Wallace of CBS News as “a 
chilling analysis of what can pass for justice in [the] military.” In August of 
1970, Newsweek magazine featured a cover story captioned, “Military Justice on 
Trial.” It discussed several sensational cases of the era and concluded that the 
number one evil with military justice remained “command influence.”97  
 
                                                        
94 Id. at 36-37. 
95 Id. at 38-39. 
96 In 1994, Congress changed the name to “the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces.”  United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, https://www.armfor. 
uscourts.gov/about.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2018). 
97 Walter T. Cox, III, The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military 
Justice, 118 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1987) (citing Military Justice on Trial, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 31, 
1970)). 
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 Before 1969, however, Congress, was well-aware of these criticisms and had already 
started studying the issue.  Hearings were held in 1962 “to review allegations that the UCMJ, as 
designed and practiced, was violating the due-process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments of the Constitution.”98 And once again, there were “complaints of command 
control,” which prompted lengthy hearings and numerous bills over the ensuing years.99  Finally, 
“with the Military Justice Act of 1968, Congress amended the UCMJ to include new due-process 
protections, such as new rights to defense counsel [and] the creation of the military 
judiciary[.]”100  When President Johnson signed the act into law, he even went so far as to 
proclaim, “[t]he man who dons the uniform of his country today does not discard his right to fair 
treatment under the law.”101  In passing these reforms, Congress both sought to create a court-
marital process that hewed even closer to the judicial character of Article III courts while also 
keeping a commander-centric framework in place. 
 This same objective would also prove true fifteen years later when Congress again 
reformed the court-martial system in the Military Justice Act of 1983.102  The 1983 Act created 
“more efficient pre-trial and post-trial processing procedures, independent (non-command) 
detailing of military judges and counsel, and an avenue, albeit limited, of Supreme Court 
review[.]”103  The latter reform was incredibility significant.  In “establish[ing] a procedure for 
direct review” of decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces “by the United 
States Supreme Court,” the Military Justice Act of 1983 permanently altered the independent 
                                                        
98 Brooker, supra note 83, at 12. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.; see also Cox, supra note 97, at 19 (“One of the most significant changes . . . was the 
designation of a ‘military judge’ to preside over the court-martial proceedings.’”). 
101 Cox, supra note 97, at 19.  
102 Brooker, supra note 83, at 13-14.  
103 Id.  
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structure of the military justice system” and brought it, for the first time, under the direct review 
of a Court established within “Article III of the Constitution.”104  Indeed, this was a fundamental 
shift that increased the judicial character of the court-martial process.  Yet once again, it came in 
tandem with a decision to keep convening authorities at the center of the court-martial process. 
 Concerns about commanders using their power as convening authorities to improperly 
influence the court-martial process, however, did not end there.  And in an effort to address those 
concerns, Congress established a commission that surveyed the “military justice establishment” 
on the issue of a commander’s improper influence.105  Notably, survey participants “disclosed” 
that they were “aware of instances of improper pressure exerted on military judges,”106 which 
was a significant finding at the time.  It established “a tangible basis for concluding that the 
amorphous concept of improper command influence [did], in fact, exist in the military justice 
system.”107  Nevertheless, Congress did not remove convening authorities from the court-martial 
process.  In the Military Justice Act of 1983, Congress “memorialized the long-standing power 
of convening authorities and clearly established total control over the outcome of courts-martial 
by allowing convening authorities to overturn convictions completely and to grant clemency by 
reducing punishments as they saw fit[.]”108 
 In sum, when viewed from a process characteristics perspective, convening authorities 
have performed actions that were judicial in character since the establishment of the American 
                                                        
104 Andrew M. Ferris, Military Justice: Removing the Probability of Unfairness, 63 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 439, 455-56 (1994). 
105 Id. at 456.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 457.  
108 Brent A. Goodwin, Congress Offends Eisenhower and Cicero by Annihilating Article 60, 
UCMJ, 2014 ARMY LAW. 23, 24-25 (2014).  It is important to note, however, that a convening 
authority’s decision to overturn a conviction did not necessarily preclude the possibility of a 
retrial.   
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military.  And the majority in Ortiz appeared to recognize as much.  Accordingly, based on both 
the history of the convening authority’s role in the court-martial process and the Court’s decision 
in Ortiz, it follows that some actors in the court-martial process exercise judicial power, and one 
of those actors is the convening authority.   
IV. MODERN REFORMS TO THE CONVENING AUTHORITY’S ROLE UNDER THE UNIFORM 
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
 
 As a result of reform efforts over the last century, “American military personnel . . . have 
legal rights that their nineteenth century predecessors couldn’t have imagined[.] . . . A steady 
march toward the civilianization of military courts has given [servicemembers] due-process 
protections” that historian Chris Bray describes as “stunning” in their “historical context.”109  In 
connection with the increasing restraints on a convening authority’s role in the court-martial 
process, a guide for this march was Brig. Gen. Ansell’s judicial view of courts-martial.  Brig. 
Gen. “Ansell, and many other critics, had argued that the role of commanders in convening and 
reviewing courts-martial cost military personnel the due-process rights that American civilians 
had always expected; justice tainted by the effects of command was arbitrary and dangerous to 
the accused.”110  And after a century of reform efforts, Congress has not only imposed 
constraints on a convening authority’s influence in the court-marital process, but required each of 
the services to staff the court-martial process with lawyers and judges.  Together, such changes 
transformed the character of courts-martial from the severely lacking process seen in the 
Houston Riots Court-Martial into something that more closely resembles the judicial character of 
                                                        
109 CHRIS BRAY, COURTS-MARTIAL: HOW MILITARY JUSTICE HAS SHAPED AMERICA FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO 9/11 AND BEYOND (2016). 
110 Id.  
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Article III courts.  That transformation did not happen overnight, and eventually the Court took 
notice in Ortiz.111   
 Unfortunately, as described above, the Ortiz majority’s judicial view of the court-martial 
system does not sync with the executive view that has guided Congress’s modern reform 
movement, both in the type of structural reforms enacted and the nature of the interaction 
between members of Congress and senior military leadership.  As a result, over the last several 
years, the civilianization trend has arguably reversed, moving the court-martial system back 
towards a “rough form of justice.”112  For some, this may not come as a surprise.  Congress never 
abandoned its executive view of the court-martial system, which meant that it always viewed 
itself as retaining the authority to reduce the judicial character of courts-martial.  For Congress, 
the judicial character of a court-martial was not anchored to the Constitution like an Article III 
court.  Rather, the court-martial system derived its judicial character from statutes, and Congress, 
of course, retained the constitutional authority to change them.  The reform movement over the 
last decade highlighted as much, and it serves as a reminder that despite past judicial 
enhancements, Congress, unlike the Ortiz majority, continues to operate under an executive view 
of the court-martial system. 
A. THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN REFORM MOVEMENT 
 The modern reform movement highlights a widening gap between Congress’s executive 
view of courts-martial and the Ortiz majority’s judicial view—a delta that existed over the last 
                                                        
111 Compare Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2174 (describing the court-marital system as “judicial”) with 
Reid, 354 U.S. at 35-36 (describing the court-martial system as a “rough form of justice”) and 
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (“We find nothing in the history or 
constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article III 
courts[.]”).  
112 Denedo, 556 U.S. at 918 (2009) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting). 
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century but was masked under legislative reforms aimed at increasing the judicial characteristics 
of the court-martial process.  During that time, Congress, under pressure from the public to make 
courts-martial operate more like civilian courts, gave accused servicemembers procedural rights 
and developed a system that grew increasingly more judicial in character.  In doing so, Congress 
pushed a system that it housed in the Executive Branch to look and act with greater judicial 
character, which aligned with the Court’s judicial view (and expectation) of the court-martial 
system.  In this way, the development of the court-martial system across the two branches 
progressed in relative harmony even though they had fundamentally different views of courts-
martial.   So long as the focus of Congress was to make courts-martial more judicial in character, 
Congress and the Court moved the court-martial system in the same direction, steadily enhancing 
its judicial character.   
 In the early 2000s, however, the pressure on Congress changed, which, in turn, changed 
the direction of its reform efforts.  Consistent with its executive view, Congress started moving 
the court-martial system in the opposite direction of the Court’s judicial view.  In almost an 
instant, “the new reformist view of command influence . . . flip[ped] a century of history on its 
head.”113  Tethered to public concerns about how the military justice system handled reports of 
sexual assault, the modern political focus became less concerned with ensuring a fair and 
impartial process and more concerned about producing a specific outcome.114  “[T]he ongoing 
                                                        
113 BRAY, supra note 109.  
114 See, e.g., Clair McCaskill and Loretta Sanchez, Commanders must fight sexual assault in 
military: Column, USA Today (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion 
/2013/08/29/women-congress-sexual-assault-column/2725081/; JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PANEL, 
REPORT ON BARRIERS TO THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN SEXUAL ASSAULT 
CASES 1-3 (May 2017); SASC Subcomm. on Personnel Hearing, supra note 1. More recently, in 
a confirmation hearing for the Army Chief of Staff on May 2, 2019, Sen. Gillibrand told the 
nominated general—who was poised to become a convening authority and superior in the chain 
of command for other convening authorities—that she believed the number of sexual assault 
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attack on command influence in courts-martial [was] based on demand for more convictions, 
harsher punishments, and an end to the possibility that commanders will mitigate sentences.”115  
Unfortunately, “[t]he fallout of congressional dismay over the incidence of sexual assaults in the 
armed forces [was] messy.”116  Because the new Congressional focus was on outcomes instead 
of process,117 it led Congress to make structural reforms that diminished the limited procedural 
rights of accused servicemembers under the UCMJ, undermining some of the judicial character 
the court-martial system had developed since 1950 and causing several senior leaders to act as if 
the statutory prohibition on unlawful influence did not exist.118   
                                                        
cases prosecuted in the military was a “disturbing fact” because it was “going down” despite a 
new report showing an increase in the number of reported incidents. C-SPAN, Armed Services: 
Hearing to Examine the Nomination of General James C. McConville, USA, for Reappointment 
to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff of the Army, 1:12:40 (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?46 0195-1/armed-services (hereinafter “Confirmation Hearing: 
Chief of Staff of the Army”). In making her remarks during the May 2nd hearing, she did not 
mention the requirement for a convening authority to ensure there was a legitimate basis for a 
prosecution before proceeding forward with it.  Id. at 1:08:40–1:14:45.  The report Sen. 
Gillibrand referenced in her remarks was the Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual 
Assault in the Military for FY 2018.  DEPT. OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT 
IN THE MILITARY (2019), available at https://sapr.mil/reports.  Appendix C of the report provides 
statistics that include the number of cases where “commanders declined to take action . . . after a 
legal review of the matter indicated that the allegations against the accused were unfounded, 
meaning they were determined to be false or baseless.”  Id. at Appendix C, p. 22. 
115 BRAY, supra note 109.  The political pressure to produce more convictions remains today. As 
Sen. Gillibrand has recently remarked, she believes there are “not enough” sexual assault 
investigations and that the “rate of convictions are going down,” which is not “the right 
direction.”  Gabriel Debenedetti, A Long Talk with Kirsten Gillibrand, N.Y. MAG (Mar. 6. 2019), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/03/a-long-talk-with-new-york-senator-kirsten-gillibrand. 
html; SASC Subcomm. on Personnel Hearing, supra note 1 at 1:52:00 (remarking that the 
“conviction rate” for sexual assaults in the military is “sad”). 
116 FIDELL, supra note 5, at 11. 
117 “The real basis of much of the congressional opposition to abandoning commander-centric 
charging is that it will not drive up the number of sex offense prosecutions and convictions.  The 
difficulty with that argument is that it focuses improperly on outcomes rather than on the 
structural fairness of the system.” FIDELL, supra note 5, at 15. 
118 BRAY, supra note 109; infra note 136. 
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 Members of Congress, of course, were motivated to take such action in order to empower 
sexual assault victims.  And to be sure, members of Congress had legitimate reasons to be 
concerned, as well as to believe that reforms were needed to ensure sexual assault victims had 
ready access to the military justice system.  From the 1990s going forward, the military struggled 
to address a culture that contained various kinds of sexual misconduct and gender 
insensitivity.119  And by the end of the 1990s, this was no secret.  Legal scholarship had taken 
note of sexual misconduct in the military and “widely discussed” the issue.120   
 Yet despite public recognition of the issue in the 1990s, Congress did not immediately 
step in.  Instead, members of Congress encouraged military leadership to take the lead in 
addressing the issue.121  By 2004, however, some members grew impatient and their frustration 
started to show.  During a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), 
multiple senators ‘made it clear that they were not satisfied with either the level of misconduct 
that persists or existing measures for treating victims of assault.’”  And “Senator John Warner 
                                                        
119 An infamous example of this culture is the incident at the “Tailhook Symposium . . . in Las 
Vegas, Nevada on September 7, 1991,” which involved several military officers sexually 
assaulting “an intoxicated young woman” and “extensive misconduct by dozens” of other 
officers.  Samples v. Vest, 38 M.J. 482, 483 (C.M.A. 1994); see also United States v. Denier, 47 
M.J. 253 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (discussing allegations of unlawful command influence related to the 
misconduct at the Tailhook Symposium). 
120 Brooker, supra note 83, at 93;  see also Douglas R. Kay, Running a Gauntlet of Sexual Abuse: 
Sexual Harassment of Female Naval Personnel in the United States Navy, 29 Cal. W. L. Rev. 
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715 (1992); J. Richard Chema, Arresting “Tailhook”; The Prosecution of Sexual Assault in the 
Military, 140 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1993); Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and 
Military Culture, 45 Duke L.J. 651, 683 (1996); Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: 
Reflections of Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 305 (1998); Elizabeth Lutes 
Hillman, The “Good Soldier” Defense: Character Evidence and Military Rank at Courts-
Martial, 108 Yale L.J. 879 (1999). 
121 Brooker, supra note 83, at 81-82. 
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presciently warned, ‘This committee is prepared to back the U.S. military to achieve zero 
tolerance,’ but ‘if you don’t carry it out, we’re going to take over.’”122 
 By 2012, concerns about sexual misconduct in the military finally came to a head as the 
issue reached an even wider segment of the public through the documentary film The Invisible 
War,123 which premiered at the Sundance Film Festival124 and was nominated for an Academy 
Award as a “Best Documentary Feature.”125  Then, just as awareness of the issue was going 
mainstream, a commander in the Air Force, Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.) Craig Franklin, 
disapproved a sexual assault conviction and ignited a firestorm of national debate.126  For several 
members of the SASC, this meant that the time had come for them to start taking over, again 
reflecting an executive view.  For them, the court-martial system was an Executive Branch entity 
that they could directly influence through legislation and political pressure on senior military 
leaders to produce specific outcomes.   
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123 THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2012).  
124 Goodwin, supra note 108, at 23 n.5. 
125 Id.  
126 Id. In 2012, Lt. Gen. Franklin, Commander of the Third Air Force, used his power as a court-
martial convening authority to “set aside the findings and sentence” of “a lieutenant colonel . . . 
in the Air Force . . . [who] had been convicted . . . of aggravated sexual assault.” United States v. 
Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 244 (C.A.A.F. 2017).  Even though Lt. Gen. Franklin’s action was a lawful 
exercise of his authority under the UCMJ, his decision was politically unpopular.  And as a 
result, there was intense and focused congressional outrage.  Senator McCaskill requested that 
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force “conduct a review of Lt. 
Gen. Franklin’s actions[.]”  Id. at 255 n.2 (Ryan J. dissenting).  Senator Gillibrand publicly 
disparaged Lt. Gen. Franklin, accusing him of being “untrained,” “biased,” and “subverting 
justice.”  Id.  Senators Barbara Boxer and Jeanne Shaheen even went so far as to write a letter to 
the Secretary of Defense, “decrying” Lt. Gen. Franklin’s decision and “urging” the Secretary to 
“take action to restrict military commander authority.”  Id.  For Lt. Gen. Franklin, this 
congressional outrage over a decision he made in his role as a convening authority marked the 
end of his military career.  The Chief of Staff of the Air Force gave him two options: voluntarily 
retire or wait for the Secretary of the Air Force to remove him from command.  Id. at 245.  Lt. 
Gen. Franklin chose to voluntarily retire and announced he would “step down from his position 
as Third Air Force Commander on January 31, 2014.”  Id. at 246.  
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 A number of “influential Senators” watched The Invisible War in a private screening,127  
and afterwards, Sen. Gillibrand “began to spearhead an effort to remove the decision to prosecute 
sex assault and other felony-level offenses from commanders.”128  Consistent with a view that 
Brig. Gen. Ansell expressed nearly a century beforehand, Sen. Gillibrand explained that she 
wanted to “give the responsibility to a senior . . . judge advocate” instead.129   Brig. Gen. Ansell 
and Sen. Gillibrand, however, reached this view from opposite directions.  For Brig. Gen. Ansell, 
and reformers in the twentieth century, their focus was on making the court-martial process more 
judicial in response to “the complaint . . . that it was far too easy for the accused to be convicted 
and harshly punished.”130  Sen. Gillibrand, on the other hand, focused on the need to control the 
outcomes of courts-martial, attacking a convening authority’s discretion under “a demand for 
more convictions, harsher punishments, and an end to the possibility that commanders will 
mitigate sentences.”131  To that end, Sen. Gillibrand made “reducing sexual assaults a personal 
crusade,” and also “made it a particular point to remove certain decisions from prosecuting 
sexual assaults from within the chain of command, where commanders retain the authority to 
overrule a jury’s verdict.”132   
 When President Obama nominated Chuck Hagel to be Secretary of Defense, Sen. 
Gillibrand even went so far as to meet with Secretary Hagel before his confirmation hearing to 
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ensure he “pledged his commitment to taking this issue head on.”133  Once confirmed, Secretary 
Hagel made good on his pledge and “recommended that the centuries-old power of a commander 
to overturn a court-martial conviction be eliminated” following a “comprehensive review” of the 
military justice system.134  As for her efforts to remove convening authorities from the referral 
process, Sen. Gillibrand has not succeeded.135  Nevertheless, in 2013 she did succeed in 
prompting a “grand debate” about the issue that both increased procedural rights for victims of 
sexual assault and scaled back some procedural rights for accused servicemembers.136  And with 
Secretary Hagel’s support, Congress also made major changes that limited a convening 
authority’s role in the court-martial process, such as “prohibiting dismissal” of some convictions 
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Commanders from Sexual Assault Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
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Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1702(a), 127 
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requirement for a grand jury indictment, Congress notably watered down the Article 32 
investigation for all types of crimes in response to a complaint about its intrusiveness in a single-
high-profile sexual assault case.  Kiel Jr., supra note 127, at 8-10. Congress also precluded 
military commanders from considering good military character of the accused when making 
disposition decisions. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 § 1708.  It made evidence of the accused’s 
good military character inadmissible at trial on the merits. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015 § 536.  
And finally, in an organization where witnesses are transient and subject to combat deployments, 
Congress made it more difficult for an accused to receive permission to depose a witness.  The 
standard changed from permitting a deposition unless it is prohibited by competent authority, to 
allowing a deposition only with permission, and then restraining the competent authority from 
granting such a request absent a showing of “exceptional circumstances.”  Id. § 532(a).   
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and “requiring written explanations by convening authorities for modifications to sentences.”137  
Sen. Claire McCaskill “championed” this alternative reform, and it allowed the military to avoid 
the “nuclear option of removing a commander from the process entirely.”138 
 Unfortunately, even though the reform efforts appeared well-intended, many of the 
resulting structural reforms came at the expense of a court-martial’s judicial character and the 
limited procedural rights afforded to accused servicemembers.139  To put a fine point on this, it is 
important to highlight that a court-martial is not a jury trial.  Court-martial panels are not 
required to make unanimous decisions, and it is permissible for them to fall below the Sixth 
Amendment’s size requirements for a jury, which is problematic from a deliberative 
perspective.140  Research has shown that non-unanimous verdicts in criminal trials weaken a 
jury’s deliberation.141  And as Justice Marshall famously observed, when a “prosecutor has tried 
and failed to persuade those [minority] jurors of the defendant’s guilt … it does violence to 
language and to logic to say that the government has proved the defendant's guilt beyond a 
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reasonable doubt.”142  Accordingly, the constitutional jury requirements are not some “pious 
platitudes recited to placate the shades of venerated legal ancients.”143  They are safeguards that 
protect individual liberty: “the prosecutor in a criminal case must actually overcome the 
presumption of innocence, all reasonable doubts as to guilt, and the unanimous verdict 
requirement.”144   
 Yet neither Congress nor the Court have ever found it necessary to ensure a court-martial 
has the same deliberative safeguard.  Rather, before the modern reform movement, 
servicemembers were forced to rely on a convening authority’s “judicial” power to grant 
clemency—overturn a court-martial conviction or reduce a sentence—to fill in for the lack of a 
unanimous jury.145  Now, however, in most cases servicemembers are deprived of both a 
unanimous jury and a convening authority’s power to grant significant clemency.   
B. THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 2016  
 In August 2013, while in the midst of politically charged attempts to enact piecemeal 
military justice reform, “the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, writing on behalf of the Joint 
Chiefs, recommended that the Secretary of Defense ‘direct the Department of Defense General 
Counsel to conduct a comprehensive, holistic review of the UCMJ[.]’”146  In response, the 
Department of Defense General Counsel “established the Military Justice Review Group 
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Justice Act of 2016, 2018 ARMY LAW 31, 31 (2018). 
 37 
(MJRG),” and in December 2015 the MJRG published a report that “became the basis of the 
Military Justice Act of 2016 (MJA 2016).”147   
 As with a number of the previous UCMJ reform efforts, MJA 2016 focused, in part, on a 
commander’s role as a convening authority.148  In the post-trial context, MJA 2016 was 
consistent with Sen. McCaskill’s approach, placing significant limits on a convening authority’s 
ability to grant clemency while retaining them in the court-martial process.149  Notably, MJA 
2016 made a military judge the final reviewing authority before a case is ready for appellate 
review.150  Where in the past a convening authority’s approval was all that was required, MJA 
2016 requires a convening authority to review the case and send it back to a military judge who 
then makes an “entry of judgment.”151  This new entry of judgment requirement represents 
another shift away from a commander-controlled process and towards a process that hews closer 
to an Article III court structure, which again enhances the judicial character of the court-martial 
system and constrains a convening authority’s control.152 
 Nevertheless, even though MJA 2016 further constrains convening authorities, their 
general duties remain largely same.  For example, they still refer charges, convene courts-
martial, authorize searches, enter into plea agreements, hand-select members, approve or 
disapprove the production of witnesses, and, in some limited circumstances, approve, 
disapprove, or modify a court-martial’s findings and sentence should a panel of members or a 
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judge find a servicemember guilty.153  From a process-characteristics perspective, this means that 
even after MJA 2016, the UCMJ still requires convening authorities to take judicial acts within 
the court-martial process.  And following Ortiz, the fact that the UCMJ requires convening 
authorities to take judicial acts is evidence that they are judicial actors wielding judicial power.  
Going forward, this has implications for how members of Congress interact with senior military 
leaders in the military justice arena, and it could also result in a due-process problem if members 
of Congress fail to adopt a judicial view. 
V. ORTIZ AND ITS IMPACT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND 
CONVENING AUTHORITIES: A DUE-PROCESS PROBLEM   
 
 For commanders who must take action as convening authorities and members of 
Congress who are required to interact with senior military leaders, the Ortiz majority’s decision 
to characterize the court-martial system as a judicial in character raises the following question.  
What kind of interaction is appropriate?  Unlike its relationship with many Executive Branch 
officials, the relationship between Congress and Article III judges is measured.  From America’s 
founding it has been recognized that “[t]here is no liberty, if the power of judging be not 
separated from the legislative and executive powers.”154  Members of Congress are not going to 
direct a life-tenured Article III judge to produce a specific outcome in a category of cases and 
then call the judge back a few years later to update them on the status of that directive.155  For 
                                                        
153 Compare Manual for Courts-Martial (2019) with Manual for Courts-Martial (2016). 
154 Ming Chin, Judicial Independence needs to be protected from both internal and external 
threats, ABA JOURNAL (Sep. 27, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/protecting_ 
judicial_independence_from_both_internal_and_external_threats (quoting Baron de 
Montesquieu as quoted by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78).  
155 “Life-tenured [Article III] judges” have even “objected when faced with members of 
Congress scrutinizing their habits of work and use of courtrooms.” Judith Resnik, The Federal 
Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 2589, 2593 (1998).  Directly referencing the political pressure on the military, Judge Reggie 
Walton recently made this point clear: “As a federal judge I don’t have that type of pressure 
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Executive Branch officials, however, Congress can (and does) do exactly that.  When members 
of Congress see a problem under the control of an Executive Branch official, they can use their 
political influence to get that official to address it.  And for the most part, commanders are 
accustomed to this and frequently appear before Congress to testify about the results of various 
programs.156  Outside of the military justice arena, this interaction between Congress and 
Executive Branch officials seems normal and not especially problematic.   
 When it comes to military justice, however, the analysis is different, and in order to sync 
with the majority opinion in Ortiz, Congress will need to start viewing its interaction with senior 
military leaders on military justice issues through a different lens.  When members of Congress 
interact on issues of military justice with convening authorities, their superiors in the chain of 
command, and other senior military leaders, they should treat such interactions as though they 
were interacting with judicial officials.  Because under the Ortiz majority’s judicial view of the 
court-martial system, that is exactly what convening authorities are—judicial actors.  And the 
failure to recognize this point will continue to deprive convening authorities of the judicial 
independence they need to carry out their duties under the UCMJ.157    
                                                        
because I am insulated from that type of political pressure.”  Public Meeting Before Defense 
Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed 
Forces (DAC-IPAD), Dept. of Defense 81 (Jan. 25, 2019), available at https://dacipad.whs.mil/ 
images/Public/05-Transcripts/20190125_DACIPAD_Transcript_Final.pdf.  Judge Morris then 
posed a significant question: “[I]s there any way that the military system can be totally fair and 
impartial when those external and internal political pressures are in play?”  Id. 
156 For example, “[a]ll Combatant Commanders testify to the Armed Services Committees on an 
annual basis about their posture and budgetary requirements[.]”  U.S. Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: 
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert, R42077, (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/natsec/R42077.pdf. 
157 Judicial independence is the ability to act “fairly and impartially without fear of punishment 
and without control or influence by the executive or legislative branches[.]”  Michael H. Reed, 
Judicial independence—an essential American value, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 29, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judicial_independence_an_essential_american_ value.  
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 To be clear, the nature of the interaction between members of Congress and senior 
military leaders, in addition to structural reforms, is significant.  When members of Congress 
refuse to view convening authorities as judicial actors, the impact on the court-martial system is 
consequential.  As mentioned above, servicemembers do not have a right to a jury trial.158  
Court-martial panels do not render unanimous verdicts or sentencing decisions, and convening 
authorities, even after MJA 2016, continue to exercise considerable influence over the 
procedurally limited court-martial process, with some convening authority’s even going so far as 
to ignore the UCMJ’s prohibition on unlawful influence.  This means that should convening 
authorities feel pressure from Congress to produce specific outcomes, either directly or indirectly 
through a senior judge advocate or a superior in their chain of command, they may not only feel 
obligated to use their influence over the process to produce it, but actually have the means to do 
so.  Congressional pressure incentivizes convening authorities to seek political appeasement over 
justice in the court-martial system—a circumstance that is not compatible with a character that is 
“judicial” under any definition of the term.   
                                                        
For Article III courts, such independence is “grounded in the structure of the national 
government established under the U.S. Constitution that provides for the separation of powers[.]” 
Id. For the Article I court-martial system the Court has recognized that a similar independence is 
necessary as it “helps to ensure [the] judicial impartiality” of military judges.  Weiss, 510 U.S. at 
179. 
158 This point frequently gets lost.  For example, in 2013, Sen. McCaskill asked then-General 
James Mattis if he “really” thought that “after a jury found someone guilty . . . that one person, 
over the advice of their legal counselor, should be able to say, ‘Never Mind’?”  Donna Casseta, 
Senators Outraged by Dismissal of Assault Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 5, 2013), 
https://news.yahoo.com/senators-outraged-dismissal-assault-case-213240150.html.  In posing the 
question, Sen. McCaskill highlighted a fundamental misunderstanding of the court-martial 
process.  There is no such thing as a “jury trial” in the military.  See Williams, supra note 144, at 
503 (arguing, in part, that military commanders should retain their authority as court-martial 
convening authorities because a court-martial is not a jury trial).  
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 The unfortunate reality for the men and women serving in the military is that there is 
evidence that this politicization of the court-martial process has already happened.159  As the 
modern reform movement unfolded, members of Congress, treating their interaction with senior 
military leaders as executive in nature, communicated a desire for more convictions in sexual 
assault cases and a willingness to punish convening authorities who did not produce this 
result.160  Consequently, members of Congress have directly impacted fundamental fairness in 
courts-martial, something the CAAF describes as “external pressure”161 on the military justice 
system.  And unfortunately, members of Congress continue to communicate these same desires.  
Sen. Gillibrand continues to focus on the need for increased sexual assault convictions162 while 
                                                        
159 See generally Heidi L. Brady, Note, Justice is No Longer Blind: How the Effort to Eradicate 
Sexual Assault in the Military Unbalanced the Military Justice System, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 193 
(2016) (providing background on the political climate that gave rise to unlawful influence in 
courts-martial).  In its Third Annual Report, the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, 
Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DACIPAD) noted a significant 
finding by its predecessor, the Judicial Proceedings Panel (JPP): 
 
The combination of a less robust Article 32 pretrial hearing resulting from a 
significant statutory revision, perceived pressure on convening authorities to refer 
sexual assault charges to court-martial, and reliance on a low prosecution standard, 
probable cause, for referring cases to court-martial has led to sexual assault cases 
being prosecuted in which there is little chance for a conviction. 
 
DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION, AND DEFENSE OF SEXUAL 
ASSAULT IN THE ARMED FORCES, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 121 (Mar. 2019).  The DACIPAD 
continues to examine these issues and will evaluate them again following the implementation of 
MJA 2016.  Id. 
160 For example, Senator McCaskill “place[d] a permanent hold on the nomination of Lt. Gen. 
Susan J. Helms to become vice commander of the Air Force’s Space Command[,]” citing “the 
general’s decision . . . to erase the sexual-assault conviction of an Air Force captain[.]” Craig 




161 United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70, 78 (C.A.A.F. 2018).  
162 SASC Subcomm. on Personnel Hearing, supra note 1, at 1:52:00.  Confirmation Hearing: 
Chief of Staff of the Army, supra note 114, at 1:12:40. 
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Sen. Thom Tillis has communicated that he is willing to block the promotions of convening 
authorities based on how they handle individual cases.163      
 In the context of military justice, such statements are incredibly concerning.  Politically 
motivated unlawful influence is an issue the UCMJ has demonstrated it is ill equipped to 
“eradicate” from the military justice system.164  The structural mechanism that prohibits the 
exercise of “unlawful influence” over convening authorities (and judges and members)—Article 
37, UCMJ—only applies to individuals who are subject to the UCMJ, and a vast majority of the 
members of Congress are not subject to the UCMJ.165  As a result, there is not an effective 
statutory mechanism to stop members of Congress from punishing convening authorities who 
make politically unpopular decisions, even if those decisions constitute a lawful exercise of their 
discretion.166  The absence of this mechanism is what gives rise to the “external pressure” on the 
military justice system, and it is something that every branch of service has felt in recent years.167  
                                                        
163 SASC Subcomm. on Personnel Hearing, supra note 1, at 1:47:00.  
164 See United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 413 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (noting that, when found, 
unlawful influence must be “eradicated”). 
165 Barry, 78 M.J. at 81 (Ryan, J. dissenting) (describing the external pressure from members of 
Congress as “emanat[ing] from persons who are not subject to the UCMJ.”).  Of note, unlike 
most members of Congress, Sen. McSally, as a retiree, likely remains subject to the UCMJ, and 
consequently, she has a duty to comply with Article 37, UCMJ.  See United States v. Dinger, 77 
M.J. 447 (2018) (holding that “a court-martial is not prohibited from adjudging a punitive 
discharge in the case of . . . a retiree”); Stephen Vladek, The Supreme Court and Military 
Jurisdiction Over Retired Servicemembers, Lawfare (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-and-military-jurisdiction-over-retired-
servicemembers (noting that courts have “routinely upheld the military’s power to try those 
retired servicemembers who continue to receive pay from the government”).   
166 As an example, this means that while Article 37, UCMJ would prohibit the Chief of Naval 
Operations from punishing Commander, Naval Installations Command for her actions as a 
convening authority, it does not prohibit a civilian senator from doing so. 
167 Barry, 78 M.J. at 70; Riesbeck, 77 M.J. at 159; Boyce, 76 M.J. at 244; Schloff, 2018 CCA 
LEXIS 350 at *3; Wright, 75 M.J. at 503; Howell, 2014 CCA LEXIS 321 at *11-12. 
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 In fact, just last term the CAAF examined a high-profile example of this pressure in 
United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2018),168 highlighting the way in which it 
metastasized throughout the Navy’s court-marital system during the last decade.  Special 
Warfare Operator Senior Chief Petty Officer (SOCS) Keith Barry was charged with sexual 
assault and stood trial in October 2014.169  He elected a military judge-alone trial, contested the 
charge, and was convicted.170  After he was sentenced, a transcript of the trial was prepared and 
sent to the convening authority, Rear Admiral (RADM) Patrick Lorge,171 the Commander of 
Navy Region Southwest.172  RADM Lorge personally reviewed the record of trial over the next 
several months and developed “serious misgivings about the evidence supporting this 
conviction.”173  Specifically, he “did not believe the evidence supported the alleged victim’s 
account of events,” and as a result, he was “inclined to disapprove the findings.”174  
 Notably, at the time of RADM Lorge’s review, Congress had already “curtailed” a 
military commander’s authority to disapprove sexual assault findings in new cases.175  That 
amendment, however, “did not impact offenses that occurred before June 26, 2014,” and thus did 
not impact RADM Lorge’s authority in SOCS Barry’s case.176  Accordingly, RADM Lorge still 
                                                        
168 Full disclosure: I represented the appellant on appeal and argued the case before the CAAF. 
169 Barry, 78 M.J. at 70. 
170 Id. at 73. 
171 Id. 
172 Stephanie Francis Ward, Military high court finds that top Navy lawyer engaged in unlawful 
command influence, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 6, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
military_high_court_finds_that_top_navy_lawyer_engaged_in_unlawful_command. 
173 Barry, 78 M.J. at 73. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 85 n.11 (Ryan, J. dissenting). 
176 Id. 
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had the lawful authority to disapprove a conviction if he believed the conviction was 
unwarranted based on the evidence.177   
 Before RADM Lorge finished reviewing SOCS Barry’s case, however, the Deputy Judge 
Advocate General of the Navy, Rear Admiral (RADM) James Crawford III, intervened, meeting 
with RADM Lorge on April 30, 2015 and discussing the case.178  By that time RADM Lorge was 
already aware of the political environment.  In February 2014 the Judge Advocate General of the 
Navy, Vice Admiral (VADM) Nanette DeRenzi, explained to him that “commanders were facing 
difficult tenures as convening authorities due to the political climate surrounding sexual 
assault.”179  “She shared that, every few months, a decision in a sexual assault case would lead to 
increased scrutiny by Congress as well as other political and military leaders.”180  As a result, 
RADM Lorge believed “the political climate regarding sexual assault in the military was such 
that a decision to disapprove findings [in a court-martial], regardless of merit, could bring hate 
and discontent on the Navy from the President, as well as senators including Senator Kirsten 
Gillibrand.”181  Therefore, when RADM Crawford met with RADM Lorge on April 30, 2015, the 
question on RADM Lorge’s mind was whether disapproving SOCS Barry’s conviction would 
bring “big scrutiny on the Navy.”182   
 Stepping back a moment, it is important to mention that decades before RADM Lorge 
met with VADM DeRenzi or RADM Crawford, the Court noted a crucial requirement under the 
                                                        
177 Id. at 86.   
178 Id. at 74-76. 
179 Id. at 74. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 80.  In her dissenting opinion, Judge Ryan observed that this view was “reasonably 
grounded in fact.”  Id. at 81.   
182 Oral Argument at 32:01, United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2018), available at 
https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/calendar/201803.htm.  
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UCMJ for the TJAGs: protect the independence of judicial actors in the court-martial system.183  
While this guidance came in the context of a challenge to the lack of a fixed term of office for 
appellate military judges, the Court’s decision was nevertheless a clear signal to the TJAGs that 
both the UCMJ and the Constitution require them to protect the fairness of the court-martial 
process.184  In fact, the Court’s decision to uphold the UCMJ’s appellate judiciary as 
constitutional was premised on a belief that TJAGs “have no interest in the outcome of a 
particular court-martial” and thus can serve as supervisors for appellate military judges.185  In the 
Court’s view, this structure “help[ed] protect” the “judicial independence” of appellate military 
judges and thus ensured a balance between accountability and independence that complied with 
the requirements of due process.186 
 When RADM Crawford visited RADM Lorge’s office on April 30, 2015, however, he 
did not protect fairness in the court-martial process.  Instead, he politicized it.  He “either told 
RADM Lorge ‘not to put a target on his back’ or, through similar language, gave RADM Lorge 
the impression that failing to approve the findings and sentence would put a target on his 
back.”187  Weeks later, in a phone conversation, the two admirals discussed SOCS Barry’s case 
again.188  This time RADM Crawford advised RADM Lorge that “approving the findings and 
sentence was the appropriate course of action” and the “best he could do,” even though such 
advice was substantively inaccurate.189  As a result, despite the fact that RADM Lorge believed 
                                                        
183 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 180.  Presumably, this requirement extends to the Deputy Judge Advocates 
General as well.  
184 Id. 
185 Id.  
186 Id. 
187 Barry, 78 M.J. at 75. 
188 Id. 
189 Id.  
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SOCS Barry’s guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he approved SOCS Barry’s 
conviction anyway.190 
 On appeal, the CAAF acknowledged that RADM Crawford’s advice may have been in 
the political interest of the Navy given the congressional pressure at the time,191 nevertheless it 
found that such advice was unlawful.192  In the final analysis, the CAAF determined that RADM 
Crawford’s conduct constituted an “improper manipulation of the criminal justice process.”193  
And the CAAF’s holding was clear: “a [Deputy Judge Advocate General] can indeed commit 
unlawful influence” and RADM Crawford “actually did so in this case.”194  The CAAF 
condemned RADM Crawford’s actions and found that only dismissal with prejudice would 
“eradicate the unlawful . . . influence and ensure the public perception of fairness in the military 
justice system[.]”195   
 The dark irony in SOCS Barry’s case is that the same political pressure that motivated his 
prosecution and the unlawful approval of his conviction also led to the CAAF’s decision to 
dismiss it with prejudice.  Drawing on observations of cases that pre-dated SOCS Barry’s, Chris 
Bray used a “circle” to describe this phenomenon.196  “As reformers have tried to remove 
command authority from military sexual assault cases to ensure aggressive punishment for 
                                                        
190 Id. at 78-79 (“[I]f RADM Lorge truly believed that Appellant’s guilt had not be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, he would have been required to disapprove the findings and sentence 
and dismiss the charge and specification. Article 60(e)(3), UCMJ.”).  
191 As government counsel agreed at oral argument, it was “unlikely” that Sen. Gillibrand would 
have receive RADM Lorge’s intended action well and that it was possible that RADM Lorge’s 
intended action could have ignited a congressional response like the one taken against Lt. Gen. 
Franklin.  Oral Argument at 31:16, United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2018), available 
at https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/calendar/201803.htm.  




196 BRAY, supra note 109. 
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rapists, the political pressure on the armed forces led uniformed leadership to pressure 
subordinates to deliver court-martial convictions—an injection of unlawful command influence 
into military sexual assault cases, which caused convictions to be overturned[.]”197  Building on 
Bray’s observation, SOCS Barry’s case now suggests there is an additional dimension to this 
phenomenon. The political pressure on senior military leadership has not only caused senior 
commanders and their superiors in the chain of command to inject unlawful influence into the 
court-martial system, but also the very people who have been charged with ensuring the system 
operates with fundamental fairness—the TJAGs and their deputies.198  And given the resurgence 
of congressional attention on the issue following the March 6th hearing before the SASC 
Subcommittee on Personnel, this cycle of political pressure and unlawful influence shows no 
signs of letting up.199  
 
 
                                                        
197 Id. 
198 See Barry, 78 M.J. at 70-80 (describing the unlawful influence of RADM Crawford); Boyce, 
76 M.J. at 245 (recounting the following advice from then-Judge Advocate General of the Air 
Force, Lt. Gen. Richard Harding, to Lt. Gen. Franklin’s legal advisor: “failure to refer the case to 
trial would place the Air Force in a difficult position with Congress; absent a ‘smoking gun,’ 
victims are to be believed and their cases referred to trial”).  
199 At the time of this Article’s publication deadline, attention on the issue of sexual assault in the 
military was increasing.  See DEPT. OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 162 (reporting an 
increase in the prevalence of sexual assault in the military for FY 2018); Vanden Brook, supra 
note 3; Meghann Myers, Gillibrand Grills Next Army Chief on Rise of Sexual Assaults, Decrease 
in Prosecutions, ARMY TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.armytimes.com /news/your-
army/2019/05/02/gillibrand-grills-next-army-chief-on-rise-of-sexual-assaults-decrease-in-
prosecutions/; Danielle Garrand, Sexual Assault in Military has Spiked by Nearly 40 Percent, 
Pentagon Says, CBS NEWS (May 2, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sexual-assault-in-
military-sexual-assault-in-military-has-spiked-by-nearly-40-percent-pentagon-says/; Rebecca 
Kheel, Gillibrand Tears into Army Nominee over Military Sexual Assault: ‘You’re Failing Us’, 
THE HILL (May 2, 2019),  https://thehill.com/policy/defense/441840-gillibrand-tears-into-army-
nominee-over-military-sexual-assault. 
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VI. DOES THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE’S CONVENING AUTHORITY 
FRAMEWORK COMPLY WITH DUE PROCESS?  
 
 Following Ortiz, it would be prudent for members of Congress to stop and consider the 
impact the Ortiz majority’s opinion may have on their efforts to legislate and engage directly 
with senior military leaders on the issue of a convening authority’s role in the court-martial 
process.  Given the Ortiz majority’s judicial view of courts-martial, the judicial characteristics of 
a convening authority’s role (both historically and in modern practice), and the lack of an 
effective statutory mechanism to protect the independence of convening authorities from 
congressional pressure, the following question must now be asked: does the UCMJ afford 
convening authorities enough judicial independence to satisfy the requirements of due-process?  
And unfortunately, unless and until Congress takes a judicial view of courts-martial and amends 
the UCMJ, there is an argument that the UCMJ’s convening authority framework does not 
comply with due-process.     
 Even though Congress has the constitutional authority to enact military justice legislation, 
there are limits.  As the Court has expressly recognized, “Congress . . . is subject to the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause when legislating in the area of military affairs, and that 
Clause provides some measure of protection to defendants in military proceedings.”200  To that 
end, “a basic requirement of due process” is “a fair trial in a fair tribunal,” meaning that in order 
for Congress to meet the requirements of due process in the context of a court-martial, it must 
                                                        
200 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 176. Regarding the importance of the Due Process Clause to the military 
justice system, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals has even gone so far as to describe it as the 
“singular bedrock for our system of [military] justice.  From it follows the presumption of 
innocence, overcome only when one’s guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance 
with the Constitution.”  United States v. Garcia, 2015 CCA LEXIS 335, *19 (A.C.C.A. Aug. 18, 
2015) (unpublished). 
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give judicial actors enough independence to be impartial.201  Therefore, at the forefront of the 
due-process analysis is a question about the lack of structural safeguards protecting convening 
authorities from congressional pressure.  Absent such a statutory safeguard, has Congress 
complied with the requirements of the Due Process Clause?   
 There is no statute prohibiting most members of Congress from pressuring military 
commanders to produce specific results in either an individual court-martial or a category of 
cases.  Article 37, UCMJ prohibits military personnel from unlawfully influencing a convening 
authority, and it prohibits a military commander from unlawfully influencing a court-martial.  
But it does not prohibit civilian members of Congress from applying pressure to convening 
authorities, their superiors in the chain of command, or to the military justice system more 
generally, in order to achieve specific outcomes.  As a result, the UCMJ lacks the statutory shield 
it needs to protect the military justice system from improper congressional influence, which, in 
turn, means there is little structural resistance to members of Congress who use their political 
influence to push senior military leaders towards action focused on specific, politically popular, 
outcomes with little concern for due process or the facts of a given case. 
 Even after the MJA 2016 reforms, this remains a continuing problem.  While it is true 
that a convening authority’s discretion today is much more limited than it was during the 
“foundational period” of military justice,202 that fact should not detract from the significance of 
this issue or the need to protect convening authorities from congressional pressure going 
forward.  Even after MJA 2016, there are still circumstances where a convening authority retains 
                                                        
201 Id. at 178 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)). 
202 Id.  Military Justice Act of 2016, supra note 148, at §§ 5321, 5322. David A. Schlueter, 
Reforming Military Justice: An Analysis of the Military Justice Act of 2016, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
1, 73 (describing changes to the convening authority’s post-trial review power). 
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the authority to disapprove a conviction and modify a sentence,203 which means that a convening 
authority’s post-trial actions, even though substantially limited in scope, will still be judicial in 
nature.  Moreover, in other areas of the post-MJA 2016 court-martial process, a convening 
authority’s actions retain the hallmarks of judicial action.  They involve the “exercise of . . . 
discretion”204 and require convening authorities to be “just,” “impartial,” and “fair” in the 
exercise of that discretion. 205  For example, to ensure that servicemembers receive a “fair trial in 
a fair tribunal,”206 considerations of fairness must guide a convening authority’s selection of the 
members who will sit in judgment of an accused at a court-martial.207  In MJA 2016, military 
commander’s retained this authority to hand-pick the “best qualified” members according to the 
criteria listed in Article 25, UCMJ, and accordingly, this represents another action that is judicial 
in nature.208 
 In MJA 2016 convening authorities also retained the authority to authorize expert 
witnesses at government expense, both for the prosecution and defense,209 which is a decision 
that requires a convening authority to act impartially.  And the MJA 2016 reforms still permit a 
military “commander” to authorize a probable cause search.210  A search authorization can only 
                                                        
203 Id. at § 5323. 
204 A “judicial act” is defined as an “act involving the exercise of judicial power,” and “judicial 
power” involves “the exercise of judgment and discretion[.]”  Black’s Law Dictionary 28, 924 
(9th ed. 2009).  This is distinct from “ministerial” power, which “involves obedience to 
instructions or laws instead of discretion[.]” Id. at 1086.  
205 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 1228 (1993); see also Black’s 
Law Dictionary 943 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “justice”). 
206 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 178 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)). 
207 United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213 (1994) (expressing concern about a convening 
authority’s selection process and recognizing that a convening authority’s “broad discretion” in 
“selecting court-martial panels clearly constitutes a system” that is “susceptible to abuse[.]”).  
208 “The selection method of the personnel is so intimately connected with the organization of the 
court it cannot be considered other than judicial in nature.” Hansen, supra note 48 at 24. 
209 Rule for Courts-Martial 921, Manual for Courts-Martial (2019). 
210 Id. 
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be “issued by an impartial individual,” and under the rule, commanders are grouped together 
with military judges and military magistrates as individuals who can carry out such action.211  
Therefore, even though a convening authority’s actions in some areas of the court-martial 
process may not meet the definition of “judicial acts,” MJA 2016 did not change the fact that 
convening authorities must perform judicial acts under the UCMJ—actions that must be taken 
“without partiality, favor, or affection.”212   
 While the Court has never considered a due-process challenge to the UCMJ based on a 
convening authority’s lack of independence, its decision in Weiss v. United States is instructive.  
In Weiss the Court considered a due-process challenge to the UCMJ based on the lack of fixed 
tenure for military judges.213  The petitioner’s challenge was grounded in the “assumption” that 
the lack of a fixed tenure meant a lack of judicial independence, which is the same root issue 
with convening authorities.214  Obviously, convening authorities are not military judges.  
Nevertheless, after all of the modern reforms limiting a convening authority’s discretion, the 
judicial character of their role is still very much the same, which means that post-Ortiz there is 
still a constitutional need to protect the independence of a convening authority’s judicial acts to 
the same degree as a military judge’s.  Thus, despite the differences between a military judge and 
a convening authority, the Court’s decision in Weiss is a useful framework for analyzing whether 
                                                        
211 Id. See also United States v. Lopez, 35 M.J. 35, 41 (noting that in the context of issuing search 
authorizations “a commander must be impartial”). 
212 Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2175-76. 
213 Unlike Article III judges, appellate military judges historically did not have a fixed tenure and 
were subject to military detailing orders.  Weiss, 510 U.S. at 168. After MJA 2016, however, 
Article 66, UCMJ now imposes minimum tour lengths (typically three-years).  10 U.S.C. § 866 
(2012) (as amended). 
214 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 178-79. 
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the UCMJ complies with due process in the absence of a statutory safeguard protecting a 
convening authority’s independence from congressional pressure.   
 In Weiss v. United States, the Supreme Court considered “whether the lack of a fixed 
term of office for military judges violate[d] the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”215  
Finding no due-process violation, the Supreme Court applied the Middendorf balancing test and 
analyzed “whether the existence of such tenure is such an extraordinarily weighty factor as to 
overcome the balance struck by Congress.”216  And in resolving this issue, the Court offered an 
analysis that is particularly salient in relation to the politically motivated unlawful influence of 
today:  
A fixed term of office, as petitioners recognize, is not an end in itself.  It is a means 
of promoting judicial independence, which in turn helps to ensure judicial 
impartiality.  We believe the applicable provisions of the UCMJ, and corresponding 
regulations, by insulating military judges from the effects of command influence, 
sufficiently preserve judicial impartiality so as to satisfy the Due Process Clause. 
 
Article 26 places military judges under the authority of the appropriate Judge 
Advocate General rather than under the authority of the convening officer.  10 
U.S.C. § 826.  Rather than exacerbating the alleged problems relating to judicial 
independence, as petitioners suggest, we believe the structure helps protect that 
independence.  Like all military officers, Congress made military judges 
accountable to a superior officer for the performance of their duties.  By placing 
judges under the control of Judge Advocates General, who have no interest in the 
outcome of a particular court-martial, we believe Congress has achieved an 
acceptable balance between independence and accountability.  
 
                                                        
215 Id. at 165.  
216 Id. at 179.  Notably, the majority in Weiss used a due-process standard that was different from 
the standards put forth by the petitioner and the government.  The petitioner advocated for 
application of the test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), while the 
government advocated for application of Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992).  Id. at 177. 
The Weiss majority rejected both and applied Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) instead, 
making it more difficult to prevail on a due-process challenge in the military context.  Id. While 
it is beyond the scope of this Article, whether the Weiss majority applied the appropriate standard 
is something that merits consideration in conjunction with the argument outlined here. 
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 With respect to the question of a convening authority’s independence, the relevant issue 
under Weiss is whether “the applicable provisions of the UCMJ . . . insulate” convening 
authorities “from the effects of [external] influence . . . sufficiently to preserve judicial 
impartiality so as to satisfy the Due Process Clause.”217  And if the UCMJ insulates convening 
authorities from external pressure in the same way that it insulates military judges, then the 
analysis is straightforward.  Under Weiss, there likely would be no due-process issue.  So long as 
convening authorities fall under the protection of someone who has “no interest in the outcome 
of a particular court-martial,”218 the Court would likely conclude that Congress struck an 
“acceptable balance between accountability and independence.”219   
 Unfortunately, however, convening authorities do not fall under the protection of an 
officer who has no interest in the outcome of a particular court-martial.  Congress has not 
insulated convening authorities in the same way as military judges.  Unlike military judges, 
Congress did not give a neutral officer supervisory authority over convening authorities.220  
Instead, convening authorities—senior officers who fall under a traditional chain of command 
and require Senate confirmation for promotion—are exposed to political influence in a way that 
military judges are not.  Therefore, it is possible to argue that Congress has not struck an 
acceptable balance between independence and accountability when it comes to convening 
authorities. 
                                                        
217 Id. at 179. 
218 Id. In Weiss the Supreme Court viewed the supervisors of military judges, the Judge 
Advocates General, as not having an interest in the outcome of a particular case. Id.  Recent 
cases, however, have called that observation into question. See supra Sections IV-V.  
219 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 180. 
220 In fact, as RADM Crawford’s conduct in Barry demonstrates, the officer who is supposed to 
exercise neutral supervisory authority over military judges, may, in fact, be a source of unlawful 
influence, compounding the harm associated with the pressure from Congress to produce specific 
outcomes.  
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 By definition, a convening authority includes “a commissioned officer in command.”221  
Articles 22 through 24 define who may convene courts-martial, and for general courts-martial, 
Congress lists the following: the President, the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, 
the service Secretary, and several delineated military commanders from each service.222  In 
practice, however, general court-martial convening authorities are usually admirals and generals 
who require senate confirmation to advance to the next rank.  And as recent history has 
demonstrated, some senators are willing to block a commander’s promotion when they are 
unhappy with the commander’s decisions as a convening authority.223  In the March 6th hearing 
before the SASC Subcommittee on Personnel, Sen. Tillis made this point clear.  He explained 
that he is consulted on military promotions and would “guarantee” that “if there is any credible 
evidence in a file” that a commander failed to properly handle a case, “that person will never get 
promoted as long as I am in the U.S. Senate.”224   
 It is here that convening authorities and military judges differ significantly.  For the most 
part, military judges are insulated from this type of outcome-based evaluation. There are rules 
prohibiting their direct supervisors from engaging in it, and their promotions, even though they 
                                                        
221 Rule for Courts-Martial 921, Manual for Courts-Martial (2019). 
222 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2012).  
223 Barry, 78 M.J. at 81 (Ryan, J. dissenting). Compare Reid, 354 U.S. at 37 (explaining that 
command influence of courts-martial was an issue because members of the court-martial 
depended on commanders for “their future progress in the service.”) with SASC Subcomm. 
Hearing on Personnel, supra note 1, at 1:47:00 (describing how military commanders depend on 
members of the Senate for promotion).  
224 SASC Subcomm. Hearing on Personnel, supra note 1, at 1:47:00.  Sen. Tillis made this 
comment in response to a question from Sen. Rick Scott about holding “commanding officers” 
accountable for failing to “properly” deal with sexual harassment complaints.  Id. at 1:45-1:48.  
Sen. Scott did not elaborate on the meaning of “properly,” and arguably, the term can be 
understood in one of two ways: (1) as failing to comply with the relevant service regulations or 
(2) as an exercise of discretion that fails to comply with his expectations, even if the 
commanding officer otherwise complied with the relevant service regulations.  It is only the 
latter understanding that gives rise to the issues discussed in this Article.   
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require Senate confirmation, are neither as high-profile nor controversial.  Senators appear to 
respect the judicial nature of a military judge’s position.  As a result, under the UCMJ and 
regulatory structure of the military services, military judges are both less susceptible to external 
pressure than convening authorities and more protected from it.  In Weiss, the Supreme Court 
explained as much when it found an acceptable balance between accountability and 
independence, citing “the UCMJ” and “corresponding regulations” that insulate military judges 
from the “effects” of external pressure in addition to the protective role of the Judge Advocates 
General.225     
 In the Navy, for example, service regulations expressly prohibit supervisors from 
evaluating a military judge’s performance based on the popularity of their rulings.  
BUPERSINST 1610.10D states that performance reviews “on military judges and appellate 
judges may properly evaluate their professional and military performance, but may not include 
marks, comments, or recommendations based on their judicial opinions or rulings, or results 
thereof.”226  These performance reviews are a critical part of a military judge’s promotion 
potential, and by excluding outcome-based evaluations from the process, the Navy has created a 
structure that protects a military judge’s independence.  The other services have also enacted 
similar safeguards, and the CAAF has demonstrated a willingness to reinforce them.227   
 The same cannot be said for convening authorities, especially when it comes to Senate 
confirmation.  There is no statute that prohibits civilian members of Congress from engaging in 
                                                        
225 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 180.  
226 Department of the Navy, BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1610.10D (May 1, 2015), available at 
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/instructions/BUPERSInstructions/Documents 
/1610.10D.pdf. 
227 See generally Francis A. Gilligan & Frederick I. Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, § 14-
80.00 (4th Ed. Matthew Bender & Co. 2018) (describing how the services ensure judicial 
independence). 
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an outcome-based evaluation of a commander’s judicial acts as a convening authority.  And there 
is no statute that prohibits civilian members of Congress from using that evaluation to block his 
or her promotion, as Sen. Tillis has suggested he would do.  Therefore, unlike military judges, 
who can rely on service regulations and a neutral and impartial senior officer to shield them from 
political pressure, convening authorities have much less structural protection.  They do not 
answer to a Judge Advocate General, who, at least in theory, has no interest in the outcome of a 
given case.  Instead, they answer directly to a formal chain of command that ultimately answers 
to a political appointee—the service Secretary. And they all answer to Congress when it comes 
to promotions and operational budgets.228     
 As a result, with respect to convening authorities, there is an argument that Congress has 
not struck the same balance between accountability and independence as it did with military 
judges.  In fact, lawmakers like Sen. Gillibrand, Sen. McSally, and Sen. Tillis have expressed a 
much heavier emphasis on accountability than independence when it comes to convening 
authorities.229  As Sen. Gillibrand has explained, she does not believe “the military” takes “cases 
of sexual assault and sexual harassment seriously,” and as a result “it’s Congress’s job to hold 
the military accountable.”230  Indeed, accountability was the driving force behind Sen. 
McCaskill’s previous effort to keep military commanders in the court-martial process.  As Sen. 
                                                        
228 See generally LAWRENCE KAPP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS IN 
THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2019) 
(discussing various aspects of congressional management of senior military officer personnel); 
LAWRENCE KAPP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DEFENSE PRIMER: A GUIDE FOR NEW MEMBERS 
(2019) (discussing various aspects of congressional authority over the military). 
229 SASC Subcomm. Hearing on Personnel, supra note 1.  
230 Vanden Brook, Bad Santa: Pentagon releases report on sexual harassment at Navy’s boozy 




McCaskill and Rep. Loretta Sanchez explained in an editorial in USA Today, they wanted to 
keep military commanders in the court-martial process because they thought that removing them 
would “weaken” the ability of Congress “to hold commanders accountable” and “lead to fewer 
prosecutions.”231  
 In the Supreme Court’s view, however, ensuring accountability is only half of the 
equation.232  Congress must balance the need for accountability in the military command 
structure with the need for judicial actors, such as convening authorities in the post-Ortiz 
paradigm, to exercise independent discretion based on the facts and circumstances of the cases 
before them.233  Even with the recent changes to the UCMJ, the fact that the statutory framework 
does not prohibit civilian members of Congress from using their political positions to punish 
convening authorities who make lawful, albeit unpopular, decisions is evidence that Congress 
has not struck an acceptable balance between accountability and independence.  Therefore, in the 
absence of a statutory safeguard insulating convening authorities from the effects of 
congressional pressure, so long as members of Congress continue to take the executive view of 
courts-martial, especially as they interact with senior military leaders and enact legislative 
                                                        
231 McCaskill and Sanchez, supra note 114.  
232 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 180. 
233 Not only is this balance needed to satisfy the requirements of due process, but also to accord 
with the “[n]ature and purpose of military law[.]”  Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 
(2019 ed.) (MCM), pt. 1, para. 3 (“The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in 
good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the 
military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.”).  To 
promote justice, it is necessary for Congress to balance accountability of convening authorities 
with the need for convening authorities to have some measure of independence in carrying out 
judicial acts that require them to exercise discretion in individual cases.  See also MCM, App. 
2.1, at § 2.1 (listing non-binding disposition guidance for convening authorities to consider, “in 
consultation with a judge advocate,” that focuses on the “interests of justice and good order and 
discipline”).  
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reforms, it will be possible to argue the UCMJ’s convening authority structure falls short of the 
Fifth Amendment’s due-process requirements under Weiss.   
VII. CONCLUSION  
 In response to the Court’s decision in Ortiz, a fundamental question must now be asked: 
if the court-martial system exercises judicial power, does its convening authority structure 
comply with the requirements of due process?  And as this Article outlines, there is an argument 
that absent a statutory reform to insulate convening authorities from the effects of congressional 
pressure, the UCMJ’s convening authority framework does not.  When it comes to the structural 
safeguards protecting convening authorities—officials who are required to carry out judicial acts 
under the UCMJ—Congress has arguably failed to strike an acceptable balance between 
accountability and independence.  This imbalance may be a reflection of the fact that members of 
Congress continue to view the court-martial system as an Executive Branch entity, even though a 
majority of the Justices have made clear they view it as something else—a judicial system within 
the Executive Branch.  Both history and current practice support this judicial view.  Yet whether 
members of Congress will sync their future legislative reform efforts and interactions with senior 
military leadership to the Ortiz majority’s judicial view remains to be seen.   
 Given the combination of recent cases tainted by unlawful influence and the Ortiz 
majority’s characterization of the court-martial process as “judicial,” it is no longer possible to 
ignore the executive-judicial layer of the debate over the scope of a convening authority’s role.  
At this point, if members of Congress continue operating under an executive view of courts-
martial, they will perpetuate the injustice associated with the current cycle of politically 
motivated unlawful influence and undermine the judicial character of the court-martial system, 
suggesting the Ortiz majority was merely aspirational in its description of the court-martial 
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system.  In time, the diametrically opposed views of Congress and the Ortiz majority may come 
to a head through litigation.  But that could take years or decades and would allow the court-
martial system to move back towards the “rough form of justice” of the past.234  To avoid such a 
result, and to ensure the court-martial system complies with due process going forward, members 
of Congress should reexamine how they interact with senior military leaders on issues of military 
justice and enact a structural reform that ensures convening authorities can perform their judicial 
acts free from “external pressure.”235 
                                                        
234 Denedo, 556 U.S. at 918 (2009) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting). 
235 States v. Acevedo, 77 M.J. 185, 191 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (Ryan, J. dissenting). 
